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Abstract
In light of expanding international trade, it is increasingly likely that politicians,
courts and tribunals will wrestle with whether punitive damages are appropriate in
transnational disputes, and whether countries that traditionally do no allow exem-
plary relief should recognize and enforce foreign awards of such damages. Fur-
thermore, by seeing how different systems address these problems, we can gain a
deeper understanding of the role of punitive damages in our own legal system and
be better able to deal with punitive damages issues in the international arena. This
Article undertakes a thorough comparative study of punitive damages in common
law countries. It examines the laws of England, Canada, Australia, New Zealand
and the United States to determine whether there exists a consensus on the avail-
ability of punitive damages. The Article ﬁnds that, despite the controversy over
the appropriateness of punitive damages, they are widely available in these coun-
tries and claims for such damages have increased in recent years. It also ﬁnds,
however, that there is little consensus on the factors that are used to determine the
amount of punitive damages that should be awarded. Some jurisdictions provide
little or no guidance to the judge or jury who sets the award. Others provide a de-
tailed list of factors, and one country even provides damages brackets to guide the
decision maker in ﬁxing the amount of punitive damages. The Article concludes
that all countries have taken steps to rein in unreasonably large punitive damages
awards. Those steps vary greatly from country to country, as do the standards for






The  past  decade  has  witnessed  increasing  controversy  over  the 
award of punitive damages.
1 Today, punitive damages are available in a 
wide variety of actions,
2 and awards have increased in frequency and size.
3
The  primary  arena  for  this  controversy  is  the  United  States.    There, 
between 1996 and 2001, the annual number of punitive damages awards in 
excess  of  $100  million  doubled.
4    In  2001  alone,  over  $162  billion  in 
1.  Associate Dean for Research, Professor of Law and Director, J.D./M.B.A. Program, 
Villanova University School of Law.
1. In TXO Produc. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., Justice O’Connor pointed out:
As little as 30 years ago, punitive damages awards were “rarely assessed”  and 
usually “small in amount.”  Recently, however, the frequency and size of such 
awards have been skyrocketing.  One commentator notes that “hardly a month 
goes by without a multimillion-dollar punitive damages verdict in a product 
liability case.”  And it appears that the upward trajectory continues unabated.
TXO Produc. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 500 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted).
2. See, e.g., Cassell & Co., Ltd. v. Broome, [1972] 1 All E.R. 801, 802 (H.L.) (upholding 
award of exemplary damages in defamation action); Goodman v. Kidd, [1986] N.W.T.R. 94 (S.C.) 
(holding  exemplary  damages  were  properly  awarded  because  defendant’s  libel  was  clearly 
vindictive, insolent and high-handed); Kolewaski v. Island Properties, Ltd., [1983] 56 N.S.R.2d 
475 (S.C.T.D.) (awarding exemplary damages for “high-handed, reckless and persistent” conduct); 
Taylor v. Beere, [1982] 1 N.Z.L.R.  81 (C.A.) (holding exemplary damages are recoverable in New 
Zealand in defamation actions under certain circumstances); Moore v. Slater, [1979] 101 D.L.R.3d 
176 (B.C.) (ruling punitive damages were appropriate because defendant’s conduct was clearly 
“high-handed  and  malicious”);  Karpow  v.  Shave,  [1975]  2  W.W.R.  159  (Alta.  Sup.  Ct.  T.D.) 
(upholding  award  of  punitive  damages  for  assault);  Lackersteen  v.  Jones,  92  F.L.R.  6  (1988) 
(awarding exemplary damages for, inter alia, false imprisonment); Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of 
British Columbia [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085, 1104-05 (noting that punitive damages may be awarded in 
any case where the defendant’s conduct has been harsh, vindictive, reprehensible or malicious and 
adding that it may be awarded in certain breach of contract cases).
3. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Realty in Punitive Damages, 75 
MINN. L. REV. 1 (1990); see also Thompson v. Commission of Police of the Metropolis, [1998] 
Q.B. 498 (C.A.); John v. MGN Ltd., [1997] Q.B. 586 (C.A.).
4. See RICHARD L. BLATT, ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW 
AND  PRACTICE  12,  17  (2003).    In  fact,  the  study  reports  that  in  1992,  there  were  no  punitive Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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punitive damages were awarded at trial or affirmed on appeal.
5  Indeed, the 
amount of some awards are staggering: in Pennzoil Company v. Texaco, 
Inc., the jury assessed $10 billion in punitive damages.
6  However, this 
proliferation  of  punitive  damages  has  not  been  limited  to  the  United 
States. For example, in England, a Law Commission Report stated that 
awards  of  punitive  damages  have  become  unpredictable  and 
uncontrollable.
7
Issues  concerning  punitive  damages  now  arise  in  international 
disputes.  Arbitrators deciding cases under the auspices of the Society of 
Maritime Arbitrators have awarded punitive damages in actions involving 
transnational  contracting  parties.
8    In    The  Loewen  Group,  Inc.  and 
Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America,  an arbitral panel is to 
decide whether  Mississippi court proceedings that resulted in awards of 
$100  million  in  compensatory  damages  and  $400  million  in  punitive 
damages  violated  Chapter  11  of  the  North  American  Free  Trade 
Agreement.
9
Not  surprisingly,  large  punitive  damages  awards  have  generated 
much debate in the United States and in the international community.
10
damages awards in excess of $100 million, but in 2001, there were 16 such awards. Id. at 12.  See 
also Brian J. Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile if the Civil Jury in the 1990s, 79 
JUDICATURE  233,  239  (Mar.-Apr.    1996)  (noting  that  $327  million  in  punitive  damages  were 
awarded by 75 of the most populous U.S. counties).
5. See BLATT, supra note 4, at 12.
6.  See  Pennzoil  Company  v.  Texaco,  Inc.,  481  U.S.  1  (1987).    The  largest  reported 
punitive damages award was in Engle v. R.J. Reynold Tobacco, No. 94-08273 CA-22 (Fla. Cir.,
Dade Co., 2000), where the jury awarded $145 billion in punitive damages.  That award, however, 
was later overturned on appeal.  See Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 2003 WL 21180319 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App., May 21, 2003).
7.  See  Law  Commission  Report  247,  Aggravated,  Exemplary  and  Restitutionary 
Damages (Dec. 16, 1997) [“Law Commission Report”]; see also John v. MGN Ltd, [1997] Q.B. 
586 (C.A.) (noting that damages awards, including punitive damages, had become “so large as to 
bear no relation to the ordinary value of life”).
8. See, e.g., Octonia Trading, Ltd. v. Stinnes Interoil GmbH, SMA No. 2424 (1987) 
(awarding $100,000 punitive damages where respondent wrongfully stole its petroleum cargo from 
the ship's bunkers and used it to fuel the ship); Triumph Tankers, Ltd. v. Kerr McGee Ref. Corp., 
SMA No. 2642  (1990) (awarding treble damages of $368,495.55 to the claimant under RICO (the 
applicable law) on the ground that the respondent had converted part of the claimant's petroleum 
cargo).
9. See The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3755.htm.
10. See Symposium: Private Law, Punishment, and Disgorgement, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV.
3 (2003); Symposium: Reforming Punitive Damages, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469 (2001).  For a 
discussion over the appropriateness of such damages in international commercial arbitration, see Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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While many commentators have written on the validity and propriety of 
punitive damages,
11 few have subjected them to comparative study.   Such 
study is essential.  Courts and arbitral tribunals increasingly wrestle with 
punitive damage claims in transnational disputes, which often involve the 
laws of divergent legal systems.  Furthermore, by seeing how different 
systems address these problems, we can gain a deeper understanding of the 
role of punitive damages in our own legal system, and become better able 
to deal with the issues they raise in the international arena.
This Article is the first effort to engage in a thorough comparative 
study of punitive damages.  It begins with an overview of the subject and 
then examines both doctrine and practice in five common law countries: 
England, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and Canada.  The 
Article  finds  that,  despite  the  controversy  over  the  appropriateness  of 
punitive damages, they are widely available in these countries.  Indeed, 
England recently expanded the types of cases in which punitive damages 
can be claimed.  It also finds, however, that there is little consensus on the 
factors that are used to determine the amount of punitive damages that 
should be awarded.  Some jurisdictions provide little or no guidance to the 
judge or jury who set the award, others provide a detailed list of factors, 
and one jurisdiction even provides damage brackets to guide the decision 
M. Scott Donahey, Punitive Damages in International Commercial Arbitration, 10 J. INT’L ARB.
67  (Sept.  1993);  International  Dispute  Resolution  Committee,  International  Law  &  Practice 
Section,  New  York  State  Bar  Association,  Report  on  Punitive  Damages  in  International 
Commercial Arbitration (Jan. 1992).  For a discussion of whether countries that do not permit 
awards of punitive damages would recognize and enforce foreign awards of such damages, see 
Volker  Behr,  Punitive  Damages  in  American  and  German  Law  –  Tendencies  Toward 
Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 105 (2003); Ernst C. 
Stiefel et al., The Enforceability of Excess U.S. Punitive Damage Awards in Germany, 39 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 779 (1991).
11.  See generally Theodore Eisenberg, et al., Juries, Judges and Punitive Damages: An 
Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive 
Damages  (with  Notes  on  Cognition  and  Valuation),  107  YALE  L.J.  2071  (1998);  A.  Mitchell 
Polinsky, Are Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable and Rationale? A Comment on 
Eisenberg et al, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 663 (1997); Susannah Mead, Punitive Damages and the Spill 
Felt Round the World:  A U.S. Perspective, 17 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 829 (1995); Dan B. 
Dobbs, Ending Punishment in “Punitive” Damages:  Deterrence Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. 
REV.  831  (1989);  Bruce  Chapman  &  Michael  Trebilcock,  Punitive  Damages:    Divergence  in 
Search of Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REV. 741 (1989); J. McMahon, Exemplary Damages:  A Useful 
Weapon in Legal Armory?, 18 VICTORIA U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 35 (1988); Dorsey D. Ellis, 
Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982);  Jane 
Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Towards a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639 
(1980); David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257 
(1976).Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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maker in fixing the amount of punitive damages.  The Article concludes 
that all countries have taken steps to rein in unreasonably large punitive 
damages awards.  Those steps vary greatly from country to country, as do 
the standards for determining what constitutes an excessive award.  Thus, 
the law and practice of punitive damages remain country-specific and have 
not been harmonized by globalization.
II.  OVERVIEW
Punitive damages, also called exemplary damages, are “sums 
awarded apart from any compensatory or nominal damages, 
usually . . . because of particularly aggravated misconduct on the part of 
the defendant.”
12  Punitive damages are of ancient origin.  Examples can 
be found in the Code of Hammurabi,
13 the Bible,
14 the laws of the 
Babylonians, the Hittites and ancient Greeks
15 and the Hindu Code of 
Manu.
16
The most generally accepted justifications for punitive damages are 
to punish and deter certain conduct,
17 particularly willful or malicious 
12.    DAN  B.  DOBBS,  HANDBOOK  ON  THE  LAW  OF  REMEDIES  204  (1973)  (citing 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 908 (1939)).  See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
DAMAGES 275 (1935).  Punitive damages differ from aggravated damages.  Aggravated damages are 
compensatory in nature, awarded when high-handed conduct increases the injury to the plaintiff.  
Aggravated  damages  are  often awarded “for injury caused to the plaintiff’s feelings caused by 
insult, humiliation and the like.”  Lamb v. Cotogno (1987) 164 C.L.R. 1, 8.  By contrast, punitive 
damages are intended to punish. However, the distinction between the exemplary and aggravated 
damages is not always clear as commentator notes: “‘Aggravated damage’ indicates that the loss to 
the  plaintiff  is  increased  and  can  therefore  only  have  reference,  or  lead  on,  to  compensatory 
damages;  but  ‘aggravated  damages’  is  ambiguous  in  this  respect  and  could  refer  equally  to 
compensatory  damages  and  to  exemplary  damages.”    HARVEY  MCGREGOR,  MCGREGOR  ON 
DAMAGES 151 n.1 (14th ed. 1980).
13.    CODE  OF  HAMMURABI  §  8,  reprinted in  1  ALBERT  KOCOUREK  &  JOHN  WIGORE,  
SOURCES OF ANCIENT AND PRIMITIVE LAW 391 (1915).
14. See Exodus 22:1, 9 (King James).
15. See H.F. Jolowicz, The Assessment of Penalties in Primitive Law, in CAMBRIDGE 
LEGAL ESSAYS 205-06 (1926)).
16. See The Laws of Manu in 1 ALBERT KOCOUREK & JOHN WIGMORE, supra note 13.  
See  also  Pacific  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Haslip,  499  U.S.  1,  25  (1991)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring) 
(providing history of punitive damages).  For a discussion of punitive damages in ancient Jewish 
texts, see Elliot Klayman & Seth Klayman, Punitive Damages: Toward Torah-Based Reform, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 221, 228-40 (2001).
17. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54 (1983) (“Punitive damages are awarded . . . ‘to 
punish [the defendant] for his outrageous conduct and to deter others like him from similar conduct 
in the future.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979));  see also 1 LINDA J. Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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conduct.
18  Courts and commentators have asserted that these damages 
also serve other functions.
19  Specifically, they “vent the indignation of the
victimized,”
20 discourage the injured party from engaging in self-help 
remedies,
21 compensate victims for otherwise uncompensable losses,
22 and 
reimburse the plaintiff for litigation expenses that are not otherwise 
recoverable.
23
There is no consensus among countries on the availability of 
punitive damages.  As a general rule, however, punitive damages are not 
available in civil law countries in private actions, but are available in many 
common law countries.
Most civil law legal systems limit recovery of  damages in private 
actions to an amount that restores a party to its pre-injury condition.
24 In 
these countries, punitive damages are considered to be a penal sanction 
that may be imposed only in criminal proceedings.
25  In fact, the 
prohibition on an award of punitive damages in civil actions may be 
considered by some of these countries to be a matter of fundamental public 
policy. As a result, they may refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign 
SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES  § 2.2(A)(1) (4
th ed. 2000) (“The most 
frequently stated purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant for his wrongdoing and to 
deter him and others from similar misconduct.”).
18. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 11, at 648; see also David G. Owen, A Punitive 
Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL L. REV. 363, 373-74 (1994).
19. See Symposium: Reforming Punitive Damages – The Punitive Damages Debate, 38 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469, 470-71(2001).
20. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages 
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1320-21 (1993).
21. See Ellis, supra note 11, at 3-9.
22. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 520 
(1957); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. V. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 61 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); 
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 n.11 (2001); see also
Anthony  J.  Sebok,  What  Did  Punitive  Damages  Do?    Why  Misunderstanding  the  History  of 
Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163 (2003).
23. See Ellis, supra note 11, at 3.
24. Among the civil law countries that permit recovery of only compensatory damages in 
private actions are Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Finland, France, Guatemala, Germany, Greece, Libya, Honduras, Iran, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Panama, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Venezuela. See  JOHN Y. GOTANDA, 
SUPPLEMENTAL DAMAGES IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 200-26 (1998).
25. See Joachim Zekoll, Recognition and Enforcement of American Products Liability 
Awards in the Federal Republic of Germany, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 301, 324-25  (1989); Wolfgang 
Kühn, RICO Claims in International Arbitration and Their Recognition in Germany, 11  J. INT’L 
ARB. 37, 42 (June 1994).Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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court judgment or arbitral award of punitive damages.
26  However, the 
prohibition on punitive damages in civil law countries is not universal.  
The codes of Norway, Poland, Brazil, Israel, and the Philippines allow for 
some form of exemplary relief.
27
By contrast, punitive damages have been an institution of the 
common law for more than 200 years.
28  As explained below, these 
damages are allowed in such countries as Australia, Canada, England, 
New Zealand, and the United States.
29
26. See Judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof, IXth Civil Senate, Jun. 4, 1992, Docket No. 
IX ZR 149/91, [1992] Wertpapiermitteilungen 1451, summarized in pertinent part in Peter Hay, 
The Recognition of American Money Judgments in Germany--The 1992 Decision of the German 
Supreme Court, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 729, 730-49 (1992); Judgment of the Tokyo High Court of 28 
June 1993, on appeal from Northcon I v. Yoshitaka Katayama; Mansei Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha, 
Tokyo District Court Judgment, February 18, 1991, summarized in pertinent part in Ronald A. 
Brand, Punitive Damages and the Recognition of Judgments, XLIII NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV.
143, 167-68 (1996).
A survey of lawyers throughout the world on the enforceability of foreign judgments has 
disclosed varying views on this issue.  Some practitioners believe that Austria, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark,  and  Italy  would  not  enforce  foreign  awards  of  punitive  damages,  but  that  Finland, 
France, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden would do so.  See generally ENFORCEMENT 
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS (Louis Garb & Julian Lew eds., 2002).
27. See Introductory Law to the Penal Code § 19, summarized in 11 INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA  OF  COMPARATIVE  LAW  ch. 10, at 93 (1986); Civil Code of the Polish People’s 
Republic art. 448 (Polish Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law trans., 1981); Código 
Civil [C.C.] arts. 1547, 1550 (Braz.) (Joseph Wheless trans., 1920); THE LAW OF ISRAEL:  GENERAL 
SURVEYS 474 (Itzhak Zamir & Sylviane Colobo eds., 1995); Civil Code arts. 2197, 2216, 2233-35 
(Phil.), reprinted in 5 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED 869 (Edgardo L. Paras ed., 12
th
ed. 1990).
28. See MCGREGOR, supra note 12, at §§ 309-11, at 226-27; F.H. LAWSON & HARVEY 
TEFF, REMEDIES OF ENGLISH LAW 133 (1980); HARRY STREET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES
28-29 (1962).  There is no definitive historical reason as to why punitive damages were accepted in 
common law countries, but not in civil law jurisdictions.  For a discussion of the likely reason for 
the difference, see GOTANDA, supra note 24, at 200-01 (stating that the difference can perhaps best 
be explained by the practice of in common law countries for juries to award damages, as opposed 
to civil law countries where judges decide controversies).
29.  See Lamb v. Cotogno, 164 C.L.R. 1 (1987); Musca v. Astle Corp. Pty. Ltd., 80 
A.L.R. 251 (1988); Lackersteen v. Jones, 92 F.L.R. 6 (1988); H. S. v. Mundy, 9 D.L.R.3d 446 
(Ont. Co. Ct. 1969); Civil Code, S.Q., ch. 64, art. 1621 (Que.) (1991);  Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. 
Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763); Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] All E.R. 367 (H.L.); Cassell & Co., Ltd. v. 
Broome, [1972] 1 All E.R. 801 (H.L.); Donselaar v. Donselaar, [1982] 1 N.Z.L.R. 97; Taylor v. 
Beere, [1982] 1 N.Z.L.R. 81; TXO Prod. Corp. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 
(1993).  See also FRANCIS TRINDADE & PETER CANE, THE LAW OF TORTS IN AUSTRALIA 242-43 
(1985);  S.M.  WADDAMS,  THE  LAW  OF  DAMAGES  562  (1983);  JOHN  W.  MORRISON,  THE 
INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 53-64 (1985); STEPHEN M.D. TODD, THE LAW OF TORTS IN 
NEW ZEALAND 870-73 (1991); RICHARD L. BLATT ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-STATE 
GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE (2003).
Punitive damages also are available in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.  SeePunitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN COMMON LAW COUNTRIES
There is no  uniform practice among the major common law 
countries with respect to punitive damages.  Countries differ on the 
purposes that punitive damages serve, the actions in which they may be 
awarded, the factors considered in determining the amount of the punitive 
damages award, and on what constitutes an excessive award.
Scullion v. Chief Constable, Royal Ulster Constabulary (“RUC”), [Jun. 10, 1988] (Q.B.) (LEXIS, 
NI Law library, cases file); Whelan v. Madigan, [1978] I.L.R.M. 136 (H.C.); Garvey v. Ireland, 
[1981] I.L.R.M. 226 (H.C.); see also BRYAN M.E. MCMAHON & WILLIAM BINCHY, IRISH LAW OF 
TORTS  774  (2d  ed.  1990);  The  Law  Reform  Commission,  Consultation  Paper  on  Aggravated, 
Exemplary  and  Restitutionary  Damages  (Apr.  1998),  available  at 
http://www.lawreform.ie/publications/data/Irc/Irc_97.html. 
A. EnglandPunitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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The common law tradition of awarding punitive damages traces its 
roots to England.
30  However, unlike other common law countries, 
England restricts punitive damages to three categories of cases: ( 1) suits 
involving oppressive action by government servants; (2) suits involving 
conduct calculated to result in profit which may well exceed the 
compensation payable to the plaintiff; and (3) suits for punitive damages 
expressly authorized by statute.  Recently, there have been efforts both to 
expand the availability of punitive damages, as well as to limit the size of 
such awards.
The first major reported case in England to award punitive 
damages was Wilkes v. Wood, which was decided in 1763.
31  In Wilkes, 
punitive damages were awarded to a publisher after the Secretary of State 
to the King suspected that the publisher had printed a libelous pamphlet 
about the King and had the publisher's home searched and property seized 
without obtaining a proper warrant.  Chief Justice Pratt explained that the 
award of punitive damages satisfies the injured person, punishes the guilty, 
deters such actions in the future, and shows the jury's detestation of the 
wrongful conduct.  Within a decade of Wilkes, courts commonly awarded 
punitive damages in tort actions such as assault, false imprisonment, 
defamation, seduction, malicious prosecution, and trespass.
32  However, 
these damages were never allowed in breach of contract cases.
33
In 1964, England's House of Lords severely limited the availability 
of punitive damages in Rookes v. Barnard.
34  There, the plaintiff claimed 
that a trade union had unlawfully induced his employer to dismiss him. A 
jury awarded the plaintiff £7,500 in punitive damages, but the Court of 
Appeal reversed, ruling that the union had not committed any tort.  The 
30.  See generally F.H. LAWSON & HARVEY TEFF, REMEDIES OF ENGLISH LAW 133 (1980);
12 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND ¶1190 (4th ed. 1975); HARRY STREET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 
OF  DAMAGES  28-29  (1962);  Bruce  Chapman  &  Michael  Trebilcock,  Punitive  Damages:  
Divergence  in  Search  of  Rationale,  40  ALA.  L.  REV.  741,  745-50  (1989);  Note,  Exemplary 
Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 518-20 (1957).
31.  See Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
32.  See MCGREGOR, supra note 12,  § 310, at 227; see also Loudon v. Ryder, [1953] 1 
All  E.R.  741  (C.A.)  (assault);    Dumbell  v.  Roberts,  [1944]  1  All.  E.R.  326  (C.A.)  (false 
imprisonment); Bull v. Vazquez, [1947] 1 All E.R. 334 (C.A.) (defamation); Tuidge v. Wade, 95 
Eng. Rep. 909 (C.P. 1779) (seduction); Leith v. Pope; 96 Eng. Rep. 777 (C.P. 1779) (malicious 
persecution); Bulli Coal Mining Co. v. Osbourne, [1899] All E.R. 506 (trespass); Owen & Smith v. 
Reo Motors, [1934] 151 L.T.R. 274 (C.A.) (trespass to goods).
33. See MCGREGOR, supra note 12, § 310, at 227.
34. See Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.). Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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House of Lords held that the judgment on liability should be restored, but 
ordered a new trial on the question of damages.
Speaking for their lordships on the issue of punitive damages, Lord 
Devlin stated that there exists only three categories of cases in which 
punitive damages are appropriate:  (1) suits involving oppressive, 
arbitrary, or unconstitutional actions by servants of the government; (2) 
cases in which the defendant’s conduct has been calculated to make a 
profit that may well exceed the compensation available to the plaintiff; and 
(3) actions where punitive damages are authorized by statute.
35
To fall within the first category, a case must meet two 
requirements.  First, there needs to be an act that is oppressive, arbitrary or 
unconstitutional.  In Holden v. Chief Constable of Lancashire, the Court of
Appeal noted that these terms are to be read disjunctively and, as a result, 
it may be possible to fall within the first category even if the 
unconstitutional action was neither oppressive nor arbitrary.
36  Second, the 
act must have been committed by one exercising government power.  The 
House of Lords clarified this requirement in its celebrated decision, 
Cassell & Co., Ltd. v. Broome.
37  There, the House of Lords stated that the 
first category is to be broadly construed to include conduct by the police, 
municipal officers, and other officials.
38
With respect to the second category (conduct calculated to result in 
profit), Lord Devlin explained in Rookes:
This category is not confined to moneymaking in the strict 
sense.  It extends to cases in which the defendant is seeking 
to gain at the expense of the plaintiff some object . . . which 
either he could not obtain at all or not obtain except at a 
price greater than he wants to put down.  Exemplary 
damages can properly be awarded whenever it is necessary 
to teach a wrongdoer that tort does not pay.
39
The House of Lords further clarified the test for this category in Cassell, 
stating that there must exist:  (1) a knowledge that the proposed action is 
against the law or a reckless disregard for whether the proposed action is 
illegal or legal; and (2) a decision to carry on doing the proposed action 
35. Id. at 1225-28.
36. See Holden v. Chief Constable of Lancashire, [1987] Q.B. 380, 388.
37. See Cassell & Co., Ltd. v. Broome, [1972] 1 All E.R. 801 (H.L.).
38. See id. at 830.
39. Rookes, [1964] A.C. at 1227.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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because the prospects of material advantage outweigh the prospects of 
material loss.
40 Accordingly, this category includes cases such as libel, 
trespass, and other malicious and illegal acts.
41
The third category includes claims for punitive damages that are 
authorized by statute.  Because few statutes include this authorization, 
these claims are rare.  An example of a statute that authorizes punitive 
damages is the Reserve Auxiliary Forces Act 1951.
42  It provides “[i]n any 
action for damages for conversion or other proceedings which lie by virtue 
of any such omission, failure or contravention, the court may take account 
of the conduct of the defendant with a view, if the court thinks fit, to 
awarding exemplary damages in respect of the wrong sustained by the 
plaintiff.”
43
In 1993, in AB v. South West Water Services Ltd., the Court of 
Appeal greatly limited the types of cases in which punitive damages may 
be recovered by holding that a cause of action in public nuisance could not 
support a claim for punitive damages.
44  It ruled that, in order to fall within 
the first two categories set forth in Rookes v. Barnard, the tort must be one 
in which an award of punitive damages was made prior to 1964, the date 
of Rookes.  Because punitive damages had not been awarded in public 
40. See Cassell, 1 All E.R. at 831.
41. See Branchette v. Beaney, [1992] 3 All E.R. 910 (C.A.); Drane v. Evargelou, [1978] 
2 All E.R. 437 (C.A.).  Many of the cases in the second category have dealt with landlord tenant 
issues,  such  as  early  eviction  for  a  more  profitable  tenant.    Punitive  damages  in  this  area  are 
relatively small.  By contrast, claims for punitive damages in defamation actions have produced 
larger punitive damage awards by English standards.  See Law Commission Report, supra note 7, 
at ¶¶ 4.13-4.15. 
42. See Reserve and Auxiliary Forces (Protection of Civil Interests) Act, 1951, 14 Geo. 6,   
13(2) (Eng.).
43. Id.  See Cala Homes (South) Ltd. v. McAlpine Homes East Ltd (No.2), [1996] F.S.R. 
36,  40  (Ch.)  (ruling  that  the  Copyright,  Designs  and  Patents  Act,  1988,  which  gives  courts 
discretionary  power  to  award  additional  damages  for  copyright  infringement,  infringement  of 
design right, and infringement of performer’s property, authorizes awards of punitive damages).  
But  see  Redrow  Homes  Ltd.  v.  Bett  Brothers  plc., [1996] F.S.R. 828, 837 (Court of Session) 
(stating that additional damages under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, included 
aggravated, but not punitive damages).  See also Christina Michalos, Copyright and Punishment:  
The Nature of Additional Damages, 22(10) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 470 (2002).
44. See AB v. South West Water Serv. Ltd., [1993] Q.B. 507, 523 (C.A.).  In AB, the 
plaintiff fell ill after drinking contaminated water from defendant.  The water had been accidentally 
polluted  with  aluminum  sulphate.    The  plaintiff  claimed  damages,  including  aggravated  and 
punitive  damages,  for  breach  of  common  law  and  statutory  duties,  strict  liability,  breach  of 
contract, negligence and nuisance.  The defendant admitted liability for compensatory damages, but 
sought to strike the claims for punitive and aggravated damages.  The trial judge refused to do so 
and the defendant appealed.  Id. at 515.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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nuisance cases prior to 1964, there could now be no claim for such 
damages.
45
The decision in AB limited the first category to the torts of 
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, assault, and battery.  In 
addition, it limited the second category primarily to cases of  defamation, 
trespass to land, and tortious interference with business.  Thus, punitive 
damages became unavailable in suits based on negligence, public 
nuisance, deceit, and patent infringement, as well as unlawful 
discrimination based on sex, race, or disability.
46
In 2001, the House of Lords rejected this limitation in Kuddus v. 
Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary.
47  In that case, the 
plaintiff brought suit against a police constable for misfeasance of office 
and sought, among other things, punitive damages.
48  The trial judge 
struck the claim for punitive damages on the ground that misfeasance of 
office was not a cause of action for which punitive damages were awarded 
prior to 1964.  The Court of Appeal affirmed and the plaintiff appealed to 
the House of Lords.
The House of Lords held that the availability of punitive damages 
should not be limited solely to those cases in which the relevant cause of 
action had recognized the award of such damages prior to 1964.  The 
House of Lords viewed this requirement as irrational.  As Lord Slynn 
explained, under the old rule, whether a claim for punitive damages could 
be brought depended “not on principle but upon the accidents of litigation 
(or even of law reporting) before 1964, at a time, moreover, when the 
distinction between exemplary and aggravated damages was by no means 
so clearly drawn as it is now.”
49  He added that “such a rigid rule seems to 
me to limit the future development of the law even within the restrictive 
categories adopted by Lord Devlin [in Rookes] in a way which is contrary 
to the normal practice of the courts . . . .”
50  The House of Lords concluded 
45. See id. at 523.
46. See Law Commission Report, supra note 7, at ¶ 4.24.
47. [2002] 2 A.C. 122, 134-135.
48. Id. at 128-29.   The plaintiff had filed a police report claiming that property was 
missing from his flat.  The police constable stated that the matter would be investigated, but the 
constable subsequently falsified the plaintiff’s signature on a written statement withdrawing the 
complaint and the investigation was closed.  The plaintiff then filed suit.  Id.
49. See id. at 136-137 (quoting PERCY HENRY WINFIELD ET AL., WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ ON 
TORTS (15
th ed. 1998).
50. Kuddus, 2 A.C. at 134.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
12
that, to determine whether a case allows for punitive damages, the focus 
should be not on the cause of action, but on whether the circumstances in 
which the tort is committed bring it within one of the three categories 
allowing for these damages.
51
The decision in Kuddus significantly broadens the types of actions 
in which punitive damages may be awarded.  In general, plaintiffs may 
claim punitive damages in any tort action where the facts show the case to 
fall within any of the three categories.  These torts include negligence suits 
and cases involving unlawful discrimination based on sex, race, or 
disability.  However, in breach of contract cases, punitive damages are still 
prohibited.
52
Six limitations restrict the availability of punitive damages in 
England.  The first is the “if, but only if,” test.  A court can award punitive 
damages only if compensatory damages are inadequate to punish the 
defendant, deter others, and mark the court’s disapproval of such 
conduct.
53  Second, the plaintiff must be the victim of the defendant’s 
punishable behavior.
54  Third, punitive damages may not be appropriate if 
the defendant has already been punished for the wrongful conduct.  The 
principle is based on the rationale that one should not be punished twice 
for the same conduct.
55  Fourth, the existence of multiple plaintiffs may 
limit the availability of punitive damages.  The reasons for this limitation 
are that a court may be unable to apportion an award when not all of the 
plaintiffs are known or are before the court, or when not all of the 
plaintiffs may have been subjected to the alleged oppressive, arbitrary or 
unconstitutional behavior.
56  Fifth, punitive damages may not be justified 
when the defendant has acted in good faith.
57 Sixth, if the plaintiff caused 
or contributed to the behavior complained of, that may preclude an award 
punitive damages.
58
With respect to the quantum of punitive damages, “[e]verything 
51. See id. at 135.
52.  See  Addis  v.  Gramophone  Co.  Ltd.,  [1909]  A.C.  488;  Law  Commission  Report, 
supra note 7, at ¶¶ 5.71-5.73
53. See Cassell, [1972] A.C. at 1126.
54. See Rookes, [1964] A.C. at 1227.
55. See, e.g., Archer v. Brown, [1985] 1 Q.B. 401, 423 (Q.B.). 
56. See AB, [1993] Q.B. at 527-528, 531. 
57. See Holden v. Chief Constable of Lancashire, [1987] Q.B. 380, 388 (C.A.).
58. See Thompson v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, [1998] Q.B. 498, 517.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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which aggravates or mitigates the defendant’s conduct is relevant.”
59
Courts have thus considered a variety of factors in determining the amount 
of punitive damages, including inter alia the wealth of the defendant, the 
windfall to the plaintiff that would result from an award of punitive 
damages, whether there exists multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants, 
whether the plaintiff caused the defendant’s conduct, whether the 
defendant acted in good faith, and the need for restraint in assessing 
punitive damages.
60
When punitive damages are assessed by a jury, the traditional 
practice had been to provide only general guidance concerning the 
appropriate level of damages.
61  In 1997, however, in response to 
excessive jury damages awards, the Court of Appeal in Thompson v. 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis directed trial judges to play a 
greater role in helping the jury determine the amount of punitive damages 
in actions against police for unlawful conduct.
62  When punitive damages 
are at issue, the Court of Appeal stated that the trial judge should explain 
to the jury that: (1) the plaintiff has already been compensated for his or 
her injuries and that any award of compensatory and aggravated damages 
includes, from the defendant’s viewpoint, a measure of punishment; (2) 
the jury should award punitive damages only if, in their view, the basic 
and aggravated damages are inadequate to punish the defendant for 
oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional behavior; (3) a punitive damages 
award provides a windfall to the plaintiff and that an award of such 
damages may mean that that amount may not be available to be spent by 
the police for the benefit of the public; and (4) the amount of punitive 
damages should be no greater than the minimal amount needed to mark the 
jury’s disapproval of the defendant’s behavior.
63
The Court of Appeal also set forth damage “brackets” to guide 
juries in determining the amount of compensation and punitive damages.
64
59. Rookes, [1964] A.C. 1228.
60.  See Cassell,  [1972]  A.C.  at  1063;  Thompson  v.  Commissioner  of  Police  of  the 
Metropolis, [1998] Q.B. 498, 517 (C.A.); Riches v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [1986] Q.B. 
256, 276 (C.A.); Holden v. Chief Constable of Lancashire, [1987] Q.B. 380, 388 (C.A.).
61.  See  Cassell,  [1972]  A.C.  at  1065-66;  John  v.  MGN  Ltd.,  [1997]  Q.B.  586,  608 
(C.A.).
62. See Thompson, [1998] Q.B. at 498.
63. See id. at 507.
64. In Rookes, Lord Devlin noted that because exemplary relief is in effect, a punishment 
invoked without the safeguards of the criminal law system, it may be necessary to place arbitrary Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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With respect to punitive damages, the court stated that awards of punitive 
damages in these types of cases are unlikely to be less than £5,000.
65  In 
fact, the court noted that an award of punitive damages is probably not 
justified if the amount would be less than that.  It added that the 
defendant’s conduct must be particularly deserving of condemnation for an 
award of as much as £25,000 and that £50,000 should be regarded as the 
absolute maximum.
66  Furthermore, the Court of Appeal opined that it 
would be unusual for the punitive damages to be more than three times the 
basic damages, except where the basic damages are modest.
67
In England, excessive awards of punitive damages are prohibited.  
Because, as noted above, English courts traditionally show great deference 
to the decision of a jury, they rarely set aside an award of punitive 
damages as excessive.  As Lord Hailsham explained in Cassell & Co. Ltd. 
v. Broome, an award of punitive damages may not be set aside unless it is 
“so large . . . that twelve sensible men could not have reasonably given 
them” or that “no reasonable proportion existed between it and the 
circumstances of the case.”
68  However, in 1990, the Court and Legal 
limits on awards of punitive damages. Rookes, [1964] A.C. at 1228.
65.  £5,000  is  approximately  equal  to  US$8,034,  based  on  a  conversion  rate  of 
£1=US$1.60675.  See http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi.
66. Thompson, [1998] Q.B. at 517.  It further stated:
The figures given will of course require adjusting in the future for inflation.  
We  appreciate  that  the  guideline  figures  depart  from  the  figures  frequently 
awarded by juries at the present time.  However they are designed to establish 
some relationship between the figures awarded in this area and those awarded 
for personal injuries. . . . [W]e have taken into account the fact that the action is 
normally brought against the chief officer of police and the damages are paid 
out of police funds for what is usually a vicarious liability of the acts of his 
officers in relation to which he is a joint tortfeasor.  In these circumstances it 
appears  to  us  wholly  inappropriate  to  take  into  account  the  means  of  the 
individual officers except where the action is brought against the individual 
tortfeasor.
Id.  £50,000 is approximately equal to US$80,338, based on a conversion rate of £1=US$1.60675.  
See http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi.
67. See id. at 518.
68. See Cassell, [1972] 1All ER at 819 (quoting Praed v. Graham, (1889) 24 Q.B.D. 53, 
55; M’Grath v. Bourne, (1876) I.R. 10 CL 160, 164).  Lord Hailsham explained the rationale for 
the rule as follows:
The point is that the law makes the jury and not the judiciary the constitutional 
tribunal [for deciding the award of damages].  It may very well be that, on the 
whole, judges and the legal profession in general, would be less generous than 
juries in the award of damages . . . [b]ut I know of no principle reason which 
would entitle judges, whether of appeal or at first instance, to consider their Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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Services Act of 1990 granted the Court of Appeal the power to vacate the 
jury’s award and substitute its own award when the court finds that the 
jury’s award is excessive.
69  In light of this change and in response to a 
number of cases involving disproportionately large awards, the Court of 
Appeal appears to be scrutinizing these awards more closely and has 
significantly reduced awards of punitive damages in a number of cases.
70
In John v. MGN, well-known entertainer Sir Elton John sued the 
MGN Ltd., a national newspaper publisher, after it ran an article claiming 
that John was on a bizarre diet that had the potential to kill him.
71  The 
jury awarded John £75,000 in compensatory damages and £275,000 in 
punitive damages.  MGN appealed.  The Court of Appeal reduced the 
compensatory damages award to £25,000 because, although the article was 
false and offensive and the newspaper was reckless in failing to verify the 
accuracy of the story, it had not damaged John’s reputation as an artist.  
The court also determined that the £275,000 punitive damages award was 
“manifestly excessive” under the circumstances.  It concluded that £50,000 
would be sufficient to “ensure that justice is done to both sides” and to 
“fully secure the public interest involved.”
72
In Thompson, the Court of Appeal heard two consolidated cases 
where punitive damages were claimed to be excessive.  Applying the 
guidelines and damage brackets discussed previously, it reduced one 
award of punitive damages.
73  In the first case, the plaintiff sued the police 
for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, and the jury awarded 
£1,500 in compensatory damages and £50,000 in punitive damages.  In the 
own sense of the properties as more reasonable than that of a jury, or which 
would  entitle  them  to  arrogate  to  themselves  a  constitutional  status  in  this 
matter  which  Parliament  has  deliberately withheld from them, for aught we 
know, on the very ground that juries can be more generous on such matters 
than judges.
Cassell, 1 All E.R. at 819.
69. See The Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990,   8(2) (Eng.).
70.  See, e.g., John v. MGN Ltd., [1997] Q.B. 586; (C.A.);  Thompson, [1998] Q.B. 498, 
507 (C.A.).  See also Riches v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [1986] Q.B. 256.  In Riches, a jury 
in a defamation suit awarded the plaintiff £300 in compensatory damages and £250,000 in punitive 
damages.  The Court of Appeal determined that the punitive damages award that was 85 times the 
compensatory damages was excessive and that no reasonable jury which was properly directed
could have arrived at that figure.  The concluded that an award of £25,000 would suffice. Id. at 
278.
71. John v. MGN Ltd., [1997] Q.B. at 586.
72. Id. at 626.
73. Thompson, [1998] Q.B. 498.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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second case, the plaintiff sued the police for wrongful arrest, false 
imprisonment and assault, and the jury awarded £20,000 in compensatory 
damages (including aggravated damages) and £200,000 in punitive 
damages.  The Court of Appeal left undisturbed the award in the first case, 
because, while it would have increased the compensatory damages award 
to £20,000 and reduced the punitive damages award to £25,000, the 
original award of £51,500 was not significantly higher than the £45,000 
total of what the court would have awarded.
74  By contrast, in the second 
case, the court determined that the £200,000 in punitive damages was 
excessive.  It agreed that the circumstances justified an award of punitive 
damages, noting that there was unprovoked violence involving a number 
of officers in connection with the arrest at the plaintiff’s home.  However, 
it stated that because the whole incident was over in matter of hours and 
the plaintiff had received an award of aggravated damages, the court 
reduced the punitive damages to £15,000.  That amount, the court said 
“should suffice to demonstrate publicly the strongest disapproval of what 
occurred and make it clear to the commissioner and his force that conduct 
of this nature will not be tolerated by courts.”
75 Following the 
guidelines laid down in Thompson, the Court of Appeal in Goswell v. 
Commissioner of Police for Metropolis, reduced a jury award of £120,000 
for assault, £12,000 for false imprisonment, and £170,000 for punitive 
damages.
76  There, the plaintiff was assaulted while police unlawfully 
detained him for twenty minutes.  The Court of Appeal reduced the 
damages for assault and false imprisonment to £22,500 and £100, 
respectively and  10,000 for aggravated damages.
77 With respect to the 
punitive damages award, the court stated that the award of punitive 
damages should be set with the aim of marking its disapproval of the 
defendant’s conduct and with the knowledge that such an award would 
74. See id at 519.
75. See id. at 529-30.
76.  Goswell  v.  Commissioner  of  Police  for  Metropolis,  [1998]  EWCA  Civ.  653 
(unreported transcript on file with author).
77. See id. The court assessed  22,500 for assault by looking at the physical scarring and 
psychological impact on the defendant. For physical scarring, the court relied on the Guidelines for 
the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 3
rd Edition, which gives ranges for 
both physical scarring and psychological damages.  The court assessed  100 for false imprisonment 
based on Thompson, which stated that for false imprisonment, damages should be approximately  
500 for every hour.  The court stated that  100 would meet the damage requirement for twenty 
minutes of false imprisonment.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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constitute a windfall to the plaintiff and deplete police funds to the 
possible detriment of the general public.  Noting that the damages brackets 
set forth  in Thompson provided that awards in these types of cases should 
be no less than £5,000 and no more than £50,000, and that an award of 
£25,000 requires conduct particularly deserving of condemnation, the 
court reduced the punitive damages award from £170,000 to £15,000.  The 
court explained that the conduct warranting punitive damages was a single 
blow by a single police officer whom the defendant commissioner sought 
to discipline and that such an award would be “appropriate . . . in the 
overall spectrum of cases of police misbehavior.”
78
In the most recent decision of note, Watson v. Chief Constable of 
Cleveland Police,
79 a jury assessed £500 for assault, £3,500 for malicious 
prosecution, £1,500 aggravated damages, and £16,000 punitive damages.  
On appeal, the Court of Appeal initially pointed out that while the 
compensatory damages awards (including aggravated damages) were 
within the brackets set forth in Thompson, the award of punitive damages 
exceeded the appropriate bracket by £1,000.  It also noted that in 
Thompson, the court stated that, except in unusual cases, punitive damages 
awards, when combined with the other damages, should not result in the 
total award (basic, aggravated and punitive damages) exceeding three 
times the basic damages.  Applying this test, the court determined that the 
award of punitive damages should not have exceeded £6,500.
80  Although 
the court concluded that the facts of the case justified an award exceeding 
the Thompson bracket, it found that the £16,000 punitive damages award 
was simply too great, especially since it greatly exceeded the £6,500 upper 
limit set by Thompson.  The court held that an award of £9,000 in punitive 
damages would be appropriate.
81
In sum, England appears to be expanding the number of actions in 
which punitive damages may be awarded while trying to limit the amount 
of punitive awards that are imposed.  In an attempt to make punitive 
78.  Id. 
79. [2001] EWCA Civ 1547 (C.A.).
80. Three times the basic damages (£4,000) is £12,000.  However, the punitive damages 
award of £16,000 greatly exceeded this amount.  The court calculated that if, under Thompson, the 
total award should not have exceeded £12,000 and the sum of the basic and aggravated damages 
was £5,500, then punitive damages should not have exceeded £6,500.  Id at ¶ 39.
81. See id. at ¶ 41.  The Court explained “[t]hat [the £9,000 punitive damages award] is a 
difference in the overall figure of £7,000.  That is a substantial difference in the whole amount of 
nearly one-third of the damages.”  Id.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
18
awards less indeterminate, the courts are giving more direction to the 
juries and judges who assess the penalties.
B. Australia
In Australia, punitive damages may be sought in a wide variety of 
tort actions.  However, they are considered an extraordinary remedy, 
appropriate only in cases of truly outrageous conduct.  Recently, a report 
by the Law Council of Australia noted that punitive damages “are hard to 
get, although it is a sad fact that more examples are emerging.”
82
As in England, the purpose of punitive damages in Australia is to 
punish and deter.
83  But unlike England, Australia has declined to restrict 
punitive damages to certain categories as England’s House of Lords did in 
Rookes v. Barnard.  In Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd., High Court 
of Australia Justice Windeyer explained that “the propositions which 
[Lord Devlin] laid down [in Rookes] are not in accord with the common 
law as it has always been understood in this country and I can see no good 
reason why we should now place such narrow limits upon the right of a 
jury to award punitive damages in appropriate cases . . . .”
84  Instead, 
punitive damages are available in any tort action where the defendant has 
engaged in a “conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of 
another’s rights.”
85  Thus, in Australia, punitive damages may be awarded 
for trespass to chattel, trespass to land, trespass to the person, deceit, and 
defamation.
86 Punitive damages also may be awarded in negligence cases, 
82. Second Submission by the Law Council of Australia to the Negligence Review Panel 
on the Review of the Law of Negligence ¶ 11.237 (Sept. 2, 2002).
83. See FRANCIS TRINDALE & PETER CANE, THE LAW OF TORTS IN AUSTRALIA 243 (1985). 
84. Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd. (1966) 117 C.L.R. 118, 160 (Windeyer, J.).  
The Privy Council agreed with the High Court’s decision. See Australian Consolidated Press Ltd. 
v. Uren (1967) 117 C.L.R. 221. Commentators believe that the rejection of Rookes was noteworthy 
because, at that time, courts in Australia typically followed the rulings of the House of Lords.  See
Michael Tilbury & Harold Luntz, Punitive Damages in Australian Law, 17 LOY. L.A. INT’L COMP. 
L.J. 769, 774 (1995).
85. See Whitfeld v. DeLauret & Co. Ltd. (1920) 29 C.L.R. 71, 77 (Knox, C.J.); see also
Tan v. Benkovic (2000) N.S.W.C.A. 295, at ¶ 46.
86.See Sales Pty. Ltd. v. Inglis Electrix Pty. Ltd. (1968) 1221 CLR 584; XL Petroleum 
(NSW) Pty. Ltd. v. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. (1985) 155 CLR 448; Lamb v. Cotogno (1987) 
164 CLR 1; Musca v. Astle Corporation Pty. Ltd. (1988) 80 ALR 251; Uren v. John Fairfax & 
Sons  Pty.  Ltd.  (1966)  117  CLR  118.   See  also  Duncan  Miller,  Restitutionary  and  Exemplary 
Damages for Copyright Infringement, 14 AUSTL. B. REV. 143 (May 24, 1996).Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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but only when the defendant acted with conscious wrongdoing or reckless 
indifference in contumelious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.
87
However, they are not awarded in breach of contract cases.
88
There are two significant limitations on the availability of punitive 
damages.  First, while Australia has rejected the Rookes categorical 
approach to the availability of punitive damages, it has adopted Lord 
Devlin’s “if, but only if” principle.  Accordingly, punitive damages may be 
awarded only if compensatory damages are inadequate to punish the 
defendant, deter the defendant from repeating it, and mark the court’s 
disapproval of such conduct.
89
Second, punitive damages may not be assessed against the 
defendant if he or she has already been substantially punished in a criminal 
proceeding.  Gray v. Motor Accident Commission illustrates this 
principle.
90  In that case, the defendant deliberately struck the defendant 
with his car, seriously injuring him.  The defendant was then convicted of 
intentionally causing grievous bodily harm, and sentenced to seven years 
in prison.  A civil suit ensued in which the plaintiff sought inter alia
punitive damages.  The High Court ruled that the seven-year prison 
sentence constituted substantial punishment for the same conduct that was 
the subject of the civil proceeding and, as a result, operated as a bar to the 
assessment of punitive damages. The court reasoned that here the purposes 
of exemplary damages – punishment and deterrence – had been fulfilled 
by the criminal proceedings.  In addition, imposing punitive damages after 
a criminal proceeding involving the same conduct would punish the 
defendant twice.
91
It also is important to note that some states have placed limitations 
on the awarding of exemplary damages.  For example, New South Wales 
does not allow exemplary damages for motor accident injuries and 
industrial injuries.
92  Unlike many other common law countries, New 
87. See Gray v. Motor Accident Comm’n (1998) 158 A.L.R. 485, 491; Midalco Pty. Ltd. 
v. Rabenalt (1989) VR 461; see also Lamb v. Cotogno (1987) 164 C.L.R. 1, 13.
88. See Hospitality Group Pty. Ltd. v. Australian Rugby Union Ltd. (2001) 110 F.C.R. 
157; Whitfield v. De Lauret & Co. Ltd. (1920) 29 C.L.R. 71; see also Darryn Jensen, Punitive 
Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Obligation, 19 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 125 (1996-97).
89. See Backwell v. AAA (1997) 1 V.R. 182, 1996 VIC LEXIS 730, at *91.
90. See Gray v. Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 C.L.R. 1, 14
91. See id. at 14.
92.  See  Motor  Accidents  Compensation  Act,  §  144  (NSW)(“A  court  cannot  award 
exemplary  or  punitive  damages  to  a  person  in  respect  of  a  motor  accident.”);  Workers’ Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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South Wales also prohibits punitive damages in defamation actions.
93  In 
addition, Victoria bars punitive damages in wrongful death actions.
94
In determining the amount of damages, any relevant fact may be 
considered.
95  However, the principal focus is on the wrongdoer, and not 
on the wronged party or the tort.
96  The seven most relevant factors include 
the nature of the defendant’s conduct and the extent of the injury caused 
by the defendant (insofar as it shows the heinousness of the defendant’s 
actions).
97  In addition, the deterrent effect on the defendant and others 
may be taken into account, as well as the extent to which the defendant 
derived any profit from the wrong doing.
98  Another consideration is 
whether the plaintiff provoked the defendant.
99  Furthermore, the 
defendant’s capacity to pay punitive damages may be considered and can 
reduce or eliminate an award of such damages if it will cause an undue 
hardship.
100  The extent to which  punitive damages will provide a 
windfall to the plaintiff may also be taken into account in setting the size 
of the award.
101  However, in Australia, the award of punitive damages 
Compensation Act 1987, § 151R (NSW) (“A court may not award exemplary or punitive damages 
to a person in an award of damages.”).
93. See Defamation Act, 1974,  § 46(3) (NSW) (“In particular, damages for defamation: 
shall not include exemplary damages.”).  See also The Australian Law Reform Commission, Unfair 
Publication: Defamation and Privacy, No. 11, 1979, ¶ 263 (recommending eliminating punitive 
damages in defamation actions).
94. See Reindel v. James Hardie & Co. Pty. Ltd. (1994) 1 V.R. 619.
95.  See  Jane  Swanton  and  Barabara  McDonanld,  Commentary  on  the  Report  of  the 
English Law Commission on Aggravated, Restitutionary And Exemplary Damages, 1999 T.L.J. 
LEXIS 22, 25 (1999).
96. See Gray, 196 C.L.R. at 7.
97.  Typically,  the  more  outrageous  the  defendant’s  conduct,  the  larger  the  award  of 
punitive damages.  See, e.g, Adams v. Kennedy (2000) 29 N.S.W.L.R. 78; Lee v. Kennedy (2000) 
N.S.W.C.A 153.
98. See Gray,196 C.L.R. at 50.
99.  See  Fontin  v.  Katapodis  (1962)  108  C.L.R.  177,  178  (stating  “provocation  is  a 
ground for mitigating punitive damages, but not compensatory damages”); Lamb, (1987) 1 C.L.R. 
at 13 (stating “with exemplary damages, unlike compensatory damages, provocation may operate to 
prevent an award or to reduce the amount which might otherwise be awarded”).
100.  See Backwell,  1  V.R.  at  87;  XL  Petroleum,  155  C.L.R.  at  472;  see  also  Jane 
Swanson & Barbara McDonald, Commentary on the Report of the English Law Commission on 
Aggravated, Restitutionary and Exemplary Damages, 7 TORTS L.J. 184, TLJ LEXIS 22, at *26-27 
(1999).
101. See Gray, 196 C.L.R. at 7 (stating “if exemplary damages are awarded, they will be 
paid in addition to compensatory damages, and, in that sense, will be a windfall in the hands of the 
party who was wronged”).Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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need not be proportional to the amount of compensatory damages.
102
Australian courts have expressed concern about the size of punitive 
damages awards and, as a result, they have insisted that juries be 
appropriately instructed on the need for restraint and moderation.
103  In 
Backwell v. AAA, the trial judge instructed the jury that damages must be 
“reasonable and just” and that the jury must be “careful to see that the 
punishment is neither too great nor too little for the conduct which is 
deserving of punishment.”
104  The Victoria Court of Appeal ruled that this 
instruction did not sufficiently emphasize the risks of an excessive award 
of punitive damages.  The Court of Appeal stated that the trial judge 
should have specifically instructed the jury that it should display restraint 
and moderation in awarding punitive damages.  The court explained:
It should be remembered that this parasitic form of 
damages involves the infliction of punishment which has 
no necessary reference to the loss suffered by the plaintiff 
and so in imposing a punishment by way of exemplary 
damages juries are asked to take on a role which they 
ordinarily do not have in relation to punishment, namely 
fixing an appropriate penalty.  The warning is perhaps even 
more important in an era when reports, either factual or 
fictional, of excessive awards of exemplary damages in the 
United States are reported in papers and on the 
television.
105
Predictions that large awards of large punitive damages in other 
countries would cause an increase in large punitive damages awards in 
Australia have not come to fruition, although the number of claims for 
such damages may have increased in recent years.
106  Commentators note 
102. See XL Petroleum, 155 C.L.R. at 471 (citing Merest v. Harvey (1814) Taunt 442, 
where minimal compensatory damages were awarded but substantial amount of punitive damages 
were assessed against defendant); see also Sanders v. Snell (1997) 73 F.C.R. 598.
103.  See Backwell,  1996  VIC  LEXIS  at  *75;  Carson  v.  John  Fairfax  and  Sons  Ltd. 
(1993) 178 C.L.R. 44, 59; XL Petroleum (N.S.W.) Pty. Ltd. v. Caltex Oil Australia (1985) 155 
C.L.R. 448, 463; see also Denise Weybury, Case Notes: The Appeal in the Case of the Mixed-up 
Sperm, 4 TORTS L.J. 214, TLJ LEXIS 8, *11 (1995).
104. Backwell, 1996 VIC LEXIS at *74.
105. Id. at *75.
106.  Compare  B.W.  Collis,  “Tort  and  Punishment”  –  Exemplary  Damages  the 
Australian Experience, 70 AUSTL. L.J. 47 (1996) (predicting increase in punitive damages) with
Law Council Submission, supra note 82, at ¶ 11.237 (stating that “fear of exemplary damages 
fueled by stories of massive United States verdicts has long been exaggerated” and that, while Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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that in personal injury cases, awards of punitive damages have been 
modest, often below AUS$10,000.
107  And while there have been a 
number of awards for over AUS$100,000, there have been no reported 
multi-million dollar awards.
108
Like England, Australia prohibits excessive awards of punitive 
damages.  In general, an award of punitive damage is excessive if no 
reasonable jury could have arrived at the number or the award is out of all 
proportion to the circumstances of the case.
109  This assessment is made on 
a case by case basis.
110
In XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty. Ltd. v. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. 
Ltd.,
111 the plaintiff acquired the rights to use a parcel of land upon which 
it intended to sell discounted gasoline.  The defendant had previously used 
the parcel as a service station and had installed underground fuel tanks.  
On the morning that the plaintiff was to take possession of the property, 
the defendant had the tanks punctured, which rendered them unusable for 
approximately a month.  The plaintiff brought suit and a jury awarded the 
plaintiff AUS$5,527.90 in compensatory damages and AUS$400,000 in 
punitive damages.
112  On appeal, the Court of Appeal reduced the punitive 
amount to AUS$150,000.  The High Court of Australia affirmed.  It ruled 
“there are more examples” of punitive damages awards, “they are almost always modest”).
107. See Tilbury & Luntz, supra note 84, at 791. AUS$10,000 is approximately equal to 
US$6,610,  based  on  a  conversion  rate  of  AUS$1=US$0.660953.    See
http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi.
108.  See  Law  Council  Submission,  surpa  note  82,  at  ¶  11.237.  AUS$100,000  is 
approximately equal to US$66,095, based on a conversion rate of AUS$1=US$0.660953.  See
http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi.
109. See Coyne v. Citizen Finance Ltd. (1991) 172 C.L.R. 211, 238.  
110.  See  id.;  Carson  v.  John  Fairfax  &  Sons  Ltd.  (1993)  178  C.L.R.  44,  61-62.  
Traditionally, juries awarded punitive damages and courts often deferred to their awards. See Uren, 
(1966) 117 C.L.R. at 128; Carson,178 C.L.R. at 61.  Today, appellate courts have greater power to 
re-assess a jury award of punitive damages.  See, e.g., Supreme Court Act, 1986,   14(1) ( “The 
Court of Appeal, in hearing and determining an appeal in a proceeding in which there has been a 
trial  by  jury,  may,  despite  any  enactment  or  rule  of  law  or  practice  to  the  contrary,  give  any 
judgment on the appeal that it might have given if the proceeding had been tried without a jury and 
the findings or verdict of the jury had been the findings of the Judge.”).  In addition, today judges 
more  frequently  assess  punitive  damages.    See  Sanders  v.  Snell  (1997)  73  F.C.R.  569;  Trend 
Management Ltd. v. Borg (1996) 40 N.S.W.L.R. 500; Private Parking Services (Victoria) Pty. Ltd. 
& Ors. v. Huggard (1996) Austl.Tort Rep.   81-397; Gorski v. Miller (1993) 174 L.S.J.S. 251; 
Gazzard & Ors. V. Hutchesson & Anor. (1995) Austl.Tort Rep.   81-337; Pargiter v. Alexander 
(1995) 5 Tas. Rep. 158.
111. 155 C.L.R. at 448.
112. See id. at 453Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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that the AUS$400,000 punitive damages award was out of all proportion 
to the circumstances of the case. Among the factors that the High Court 
found significant were that the tanks were repaired in three weeks, that the 
repair costs had been small, and that there had been no other acts by the 
defendant.  These factors, the court believed, reduced the “seriousness of 
the incursion.”
113   The court concluded that a reduced award of 
AUS$150,000 was not excessive, although it was at the upper end of the 
permissible range.
114
The case of Backwell v. AAA provides an additional example of 
where an award of punitive damages in a high profile case was reduced.
115
There, the plaintiff claimed that she had been impregnated with the wrong 
donor sperm at the defendant’s clinic and that the defendant subsequently 
told her that she must terminate the pregnancy and, that if she did not do 
so, she could not receive further medical treatment at the defendant’s 
clinic, her identity might be revealed, which would result in adverse 
publicity, and that it was unlikely that any other artificial insemination 
program in Australia would accept her as a patient.
116   She filed suit 
alleging both breach of contract and negligence claims.  A jury awarded 
her AUS$65,000 in compensatory damages and interest, and 
AUS$125,000 in punitive damages.
117  The Victorian Court of Appeal 
reduced the punitive damages award.  The court determined that the trial 
judge had not followed the proper procedure in instructing the jury on the 
assessment of punitive damages and, in any event, the award was 
excessive.  With respect to the latter, the Judge Ormiston explained that, 
“even making due allowance for any errors induced by the charge” and 
even accepting all of the plaintiff’s version of the events and rejecting 
those of the defendant, the jury “could not conceivably have brought an 
award against the [defendant] of the size that it did.”
118  A divided court 
then set the punitive damages at AUS$60,000.  The court did not provide a 
113. Id.
114. See id. at 463.
115. Backwell v. AAA (1997) 1 V.R. 182, 1996 VIC LEXIS 730, at *91.
116. See id. at *13, 37-38.  The plaintiff underwent the abortion and, after resuming the 
artificial insemination program at the clinic had two children.  She claimed that the defendant’s 
actions  resulted  in  depression,  for  which  she  received  psychiatric  treatment  and  antidepressant 
medication.  See id. at *31, 51.
117. See id. at *52.
118. Id. at *104.  Similarly, Judge Tadgell called the jury award of punitive damages 
“perversely high.”  Id. at *29.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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detailed explanation as to why the punitive damages should be set at that 
amount, noting only that “[i]n the end it is a matter of impression what 
value in monetary terms should be placed on the contumelious disregard of 
the [plaintiff’s] interests . . . .”
119
In Sanders v. Snell, the High Court took the unusual step of 
increasing a punitive damages award because it believed that the trial 
judge’s award did not effectively punish and deter the defendant.
120  In that 
case, the plaintiff, a former Minister for Immigration and Tourism in the 
Sixth Legislative Assembly of Norfolk Island, sued the defendant for 
inducing the bureau to breach its contract with the plaintiff and for 
misfeasance in public office.  The trial judge awarded plaintiff 
AUS$17,000 (of which AUS$500 represented the salary the plaintiff 
would have earned), AUS$15,000 for loss of reputation, and AUS$1,500 
in punitive damages.
121  The trial judge ruled that punitive damages were 
warranted, even though the defendant’s conduct was not malicious, 
because the defendant exhibited “contumelious behavior which entirely 
disregarded the rights of the members of the Bureaus and of the 
plaintiff.”
122  The High Court viewed the defendant’s conduct as being 
more heinous, noting that the defendant took steps “calculated to destroy 
the personal and business reputation of a prominent member of a close-
knit community and did so deliberately, knowing the likely effect of his 
actions.”
123 The High Court concluded that, in view of the circumstances, 
the AUS$1,500 punitive damages award was neither appropriate 
punishment nor sufficient to deter others from engaging in similar acts.  
As a result, the High Court increased the punitive damages to 
AUS$10,000.
124
There is one other recent case of particular note, Chen v. 
Karandois, where the New South Wales Court of Appeal upheld a 
AUS$300,000 punitive damages award.
125  In that case, the plaintiff 
claimed inter alia that the defendants conspired to deprive him of his 
119. Id. at *109.  Judge Tadgell disagreed with the result, arguing that a new trial should 
be had on the issue of damages.  Id. at *29.
120. See Sanders v. Snell (1997) 73 F.C.R. 598.
121. See id. at 573.
122. See id. at 599.
123. See id. at 602.
124. See id. 
125. See Chen v. Karandonis [2002] N.S.W.C.A. 412, 2002 WL 31831586.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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interest in a joint venture and monies that he was to have received for 
work performed in Australia and China.  In addition to compensatory 
damages, the trial judge awarded AUS$300,000 in punitive damages. The 
defendants appealed, claiming that punitive damages were not warranted 
and the amount was excessive.
126  The Court of Appeal disagreed.  It ruled 
that the defendants’ actions amounted to a deliberate and significant 
betrayal of trust that was designed to eliminate the plaintiff’s interest.  In 
addition, it agreed with the trial judge that punitive damages were 
warranted, because the defendants continued to exhibit a contumelious 
disregard for the plaintiff’s rights throughout the litigation.  In particular, 
the defendants attempted to induce a witness to give false testimony and 
they tried to use the bankruptcy system to prevent the plaintiff from 
pursuing his claims.  In view of the defendants’ outrageous behavior, the 
court concluded that the AUS$300,000 in punitive damages was an 
appropriate award.
127  Finally, the court also rejected the defendants’ claim 
that  the punitive damages award was excessive because it greatly 
exceeded the compensatory damages (which they argued amounted to no 
more than AUS$70,000).   It stated that “there is no necessary link 
between the amount of compensatory damages and the amount of punitive 
damages.”
128
In short, punitive damages are available in a broad range of tort 
actions in Australia.  While claims for such damages have increased in 
recent years, to date awards have been relatively modest, in part because 
Australian courts have insisted upon the need for restraint and moderation 
in awarding punitive damages.
C. New Zealand
Punitive damages are more widely available in New Zealand than 
in many other common law countries.  However, the amount of such 
damages awarded has been significantly smaller than in other countries.
Like Australia, courts in New Zealand have explicitly rejected 
attempts to limit punitive damages to categories set forth by England’s 
House of Lords in Rookes v. Barnard.
129  As a general policy matter, they 
126. See id. at ¶¶ 1-24.
127. See id. at ¶¶ 81-94. 
128. Id. at ¶ 95.
129. See Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129; see Taylor v. Beere, [1982] 1 N.Z.L.R. Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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“can properly be awarded whenever it is necessary to teach a wrongdoer 
that tort does not pay.”
130  As a result, punitive damages are available in 
many different arenas including defamation and personal injury, as well as 
in certain negligence actions.
131
To determine whether punitive damages are warranted, courts look 
to see whether the defendant has engaged in truly outrageous conduct.
132
Typically, punitive damages are awarded only where there has been a 
“contumelious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights” or some type of malice 
toward the plaintiff.
133  These requirements apply even in cases involving 
negligence.  There, courts have stated that punitive damages are warranted 
only where there has been an outrageous and flagrant disregard for the 
plaintiff.
134
To determine the size of the punitive damages award, courts 
consider six factors:  (1) the gravity of the defendant’s misconduct, (2) the 
principle that awards must be modest in size, (3) the windfall to the 
plaintiff, (4) the defendant’s resources, (5) the injury or loss to the 
plaintiff, and (6) any prior punishment of the defendant.
135
81, 1982 NZLR LEXIS 591.  See also Margaret A. Vennell, The Accident Compensation Act 1972 
and Punitive Damages, 10 N.Z. U. L. REV. 165 (1982).  
130. See Taylor, 1982 N.Z.L.R. LEXIS at *18.
131. See, e.g.,  McLaren Transport Ltd v. Somerville, [1996] 3 N.Z.LR. 424, 1996 NZLR 
LEXIS 812; G v. G, [1997] N.Z.F.L.R 49, 1996 NZFLR LEXIS 42; Television New Zealand Ltd. 
v. Quinn, [1996] 3 N.Z.L.R. 24, 1996 NZLR LEXIS 788.  See generally Margaret A. McGregor 
Vennell, Remedies in THE LAW OF TORTS IN NEW ZEALAND 870 (Stephen Todd ed., 1991).
132. See Ellison v. L, [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 416 (C.A. Wellington), 1997 NZLR LEXIS 
635, at *9.  
133. See Taylor, 1982 NZLR LEXIS at *41.
134.  See Ellison, 1997 NZLR LEXIS 635; McLaren, 1996 NZLR LEXIS 812.  For 
example, in McLaren, the plaintiff was injured when a tire the defendant was inflating exploded.   
1996 NZLR LEXIS at *9.  Because both s 396(1) of the Accident Insurance Act 1998 and s 319(1) 
of the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act of 2001 provide compensation 
schemes for personal injuries and preclude suits for compensatory damages, plaintiff’s only claim 
against defendant was for punitive damages. The court stated that to warrant punitive damages, 
“[t]he level of negligence [must be] so high that it amounts to an outrageous and flagrant disregard 
for the plaintiff’s safety, meriting condemnation and punishment.”  Id. at *35.  The Court ruled that 
the  defendant’s  conduct  warranted  punitive  damages  because  the  defendant  was  aware  of  the 
proper pressure for inflating a tire and deliberately exceeded this.  In determining the size of the 
award, the court concluded that NZ$15,000 was reasonable in view of the circumstances.  The 
court stated that an Appellate court should not interfere with the judge’s assessment of punitive 
damages unless it is above or below a reasonable range.  Here, the court determined that the sum is 
reasonable and that neither party could prove that the judge erred in assessing the damages. Id. at 
*38-*39.
135.  See  Joanna  Manning,  Reflections  on  Punitive  Damages  and  Personal  Injury Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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The central focus in determining the size of the award is on the 
gravity of the conduct.  According to New Zealand courts, the amount of a 
punitive damages award must be proportionate to the defendant’s 
misconduct.
136
The first factor, however, is limited by the second, which mandates 
that awards of punitive damages are to be modest in amount.  As the Court 
of Appeal explained in Ellison v. L, “[t]he marking out and punishment of 
outrageous behavior can be adequately achieved by a relatively modest 
[punitive] penalty.”
137  Thus, New Zealand courts have stated that awards 
of between NZ$20,000 and NZ$30,000 are appropriate in negligence cases 
when the defendant’s conduct warrants punitive damages.
138
The third factor, the benefit to the plaintiff, also serves to limit the 
size of any punitive damages awards.  It is meant to emphasize that 
punitive damages do not have a compensatory component in New Zealand.  
As a result, any amount awarded should be modest because it would result 
in a windfall to the plaintiff, and, in cases where the defendant is a public 
entity, the windfall may be at the expense of the public generally.
139
The fourth factor looks to the defendant’s ability to pay the 
punitive damages award.  Here, the focus is on the net value of the 
defendant’s assets, debts, dependants, and income potential.
140  The 
application of this factor also can limit the size of the punitive damages 
award to an amount that the defendant can afford to pay.
141
The fifth factor is the extent to which the plaintiff’s injuries show 
the heinousness of the defendant’s conduct.
142  The case of G v. G
illustrates the application of this factor.  There, the plaintiff claimed she 
Liability in New Zealand, 2002 N.Z. L. REV. 143, 178 (2002); Stephen Todd, Exemplary Damages, 
18 N.Z. L. REV. 145, 188 (1998).
136. See Ellison, 1997 NZLR LEXIS at *9; McLaren, 1996 NZLR LEXIS at *36-37;  
Williams  v.  Duvalier  Investments  Ltd.  [1999]  D.C.R.  897  (D.C.  Auckland),  1999  N.Z.D.C.R. 
LEXIS 15; Abel v. Brownlee, [2002] D.C.R. 407 (D.C. Auckland), 2002 N.X.D.C.R. LEXIS 10.
137. Ellison, 1997 NZLR LEXIS at *9.
138. See L v. Robinson, [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. 499, 2000 NZLR LEXIS 285, at *37.
139. See Todd, supra note 135, at 188.
140. See G v. G, 1996 NZFLR LEXIS at *46.
141. See H v. R, [1996] N.Z.F.L.R. 224, 1995 NZFLR LEXIS 77, at *3-6.  In H v R, 
plaintiff claimed that the defendant sexual abuse resulted in physical and psychological difficulties 
and, as a result, NZ$250,000 in punitive damages.  Because, inter alia, the defendant was  88 year 
old man who was funding his own defense and was experiencing financial difficulties, the court 
awarded plaintiff NZ$20,000.  Id. at *11-12, *27.
142. Todd, supra note 135, at 190.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
28
was battered and abused by the defendant and sought punitive damages.  
The defendant admitted to hitting the plaintiff over a four year period, but 
argued that the attacks were in response to abuse from the plaintiff.  The 
court ruled that the defendant’s actions warranted punitive damages.  In 
determining the size of the award, the court focused on the physical 
assaults, noting that acts of violence against family members are strongly 
condemned. 
143 It stated that “outrageous behaviour might well attract a 
punitive response but the level of damages must to a degree take into 
account how much a plaintiff has or will suffer as a result of that 
behaviour.”
144  Here, the plaintiff suffered physically and emotionally, 
including scarring on her lower back and post-traumatic stress disorder.  In 
assessing damages, the court stated inter alia that the severity of the 
violence warrants an award of NZ$85,000.
The sixth factor considers whether the defendant has already been 
punished for his or her misconduct.  The Court of Appeal held and the 
Privy Council later affirmed that punitive damages cannot be awarded if 
the defendant has already been subject to a criminal proceeding for the 
same conduct.  Punitive damages are barred in the civil action if the 
defendant was convicted, penalized, or acquitted.  Furthermore, a claim for
punitive damages must be stayed if it is likely that a criminal proceeding 
will result from the defendant’s act.
145
In general, punitive damages awards in New Zealand have been 
significantly lower than in other countries. Awards of such damages have 
ranged from NZ$10,000 to NZ$85,000, with NZ$31,000 being the average 
award.
146 There are three primary reasons for this practice.
143. See G. v. G, 1996 NZFLR LEXIS at *32-33.
144. Id. at *41-42.
145. See Daniels. v. Thompson, [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. 22; 1998 NZLR LEXIS 99, *73-74, 
80, 84.  See also John Smillie, Exemplary Damages and the Criminal Law, 6 TORTS L.J. 113 
(1998).
146. See Manning, supra note 135, at 180-81.  Two cases where the plaintiffs received 
higher awards of punitive damages are G v. G and Television New Zealand Ltd v. Quinn.  In the 
former, the punitive damages claim was for NZ$200,000, but the court awarded NZ$85,000.  In the 
latter, the Court of Appeal upheld a NZ $400,000 global award, which included a punitive element.  
See G v. G, 1996 NZFLR LEXIS at *47; New Zealand Television Ltd., [1996] 3 NZLR 24, 1996 
NZLR LEXIS 788, at *104.  The court stated that of the NZ$400,000, a substantial portion could 
possibly  be  attributed  to  compensatory  and  aggravated  damages,  but  even  then  to  make  up 
NZ$400,000, a large portion must be attributed to exemplary damages.  However, the court was 
unable to say that “the sum must necessarily have been so large as to fall outside general principles 
and to be excessive accordingly.”Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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The first reason for the modest size of these awards is that the sole 
purpose of punitive damages in New Zealand is to punish the defendant.
147
In Bottrill v. A, the court considered whether to expand the rationale for 
awarding punitive damages not only to  punish the defendant, but also to 
deter future misconduct.
148  The court declined to do so stating that it is 
“too late and inconsistent with the evolution of punitive damages in New 
Zealand . . . to change the focus and emphasize a general deterrence 
rationale.”
149  Thus, because the only purpose for awarding punitive 
damages is to punish the defendant, it has had the effect of limiting the 
size of awards of such damages.
150
The second reason for why punitive damages awards have been 
modest is that judges, not juries typically award such damages.
151  In New 
Zealand, trial by jury in the civil arena is uncommon, except for 
defamation, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment claims.  One 
commentator notes that the highest punitive damages awards are in 
defamation cases.
152
The third, and perhaps most important reason, is that courts in New 
Zealand have consistently enforced the principle that punitive damages are 
to be modest in size.
153   This principle was explained in Williams v. 
Duvalier Investment Ltd.:
New Zealand courts are conservative in their approach to punitive 
damages reserving them for cases of truly outrageous conduct 
which cannot be adequately punished in any other way.  They are 
awarded only in serious and exceptional cases.  The making out 
and punishment of outrageous behaviour can be adequately 
achieved by a relatively modest penalty.  It is to be remembered 
147. See A v. Bottrill, [2001] 3 N.Z.L.R. 622 (C.A. Wellington), 2001 NZLR LEXIS 
161.
148. See id. at *37.
149. Id.
150. See Manning, supra note 135, at 152.  But see John Smillie, Exemplary Damages 
for Personal Injury, 1997 N.Z. L. REV. 140 (arguing that punitive damages have been used in the 
past to compensate rather than to punish and deter).
151. See Todd, supra note 135, at 194.
152. See Manning, supra note 135, at 182.  See also New Zealand Television Ltd., [1996] 
3 NZLR 24, 1996 NZLR LEXIS 788.
153. See Williams v. Duvalier Inv. Ltd, [1999], D.C.R. 897, 1999 NZDCR LEXIS 15, at 
*28.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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that such awards are not intended as compensation.
154
Because of this principle and admonitions from courts on seeking large 
amounts of punitive damages, the claims for such damages have been 
relative small as compared to other countries.
155
Like in other countries, New Zealand prohibits excessive awards of 
punitive damages.  There appear to be very few cases that have been 
overturned on appeal on the basis that the amount of punitive damages was 
exorbitantly high.  In Wellington Newspapers Ltd v. Dealers Guide Ltd., 
the court set forth the test to determine when an award of punitive 
damages is excessive:
In order to justify reversing the trial judge on the question of the 
amount of damages it will generally be necessary that this court 
should be convinced either that the judge acted upon some wrong 
principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high 
or so very small as to make it . . . an entirely erroneous estimate of 
the damage to which the plaintiff is entitled.
156
An example of a case where an award of punitive damages was 
overturned by the High Court is Duffy v. Attorney General.  There, the 
plaintiff was unlawfully detained by the police on suspicion of 
drunkenness.  The jury awarded NZ$60,000 in damages, including 
punitive damages (although the amount attributed to exemplary relief was 
not stated).  The court ruled the punitive damages portion of the award was 
excessive.  It stated that in order to overturn the jury’s award, “[i]t must be 
plain that no reasonable jury properly applying the relevant principles 
could have awarded so large a sum.”
157  The court concluded that no more 
154. Id.
155. See Ellison, 1997 NZLR LEXIS at *10 (“Legal advisers should be careful not to be 
associated with claims for amounts of damages which on any objective view are unattainable and 
give  the  appearance  of  being  brought  in  terrorem.”);  see,  e.g., McLaren  Transport  Ltd.,  1996 
NZLR at *38 (seeking NZ$30,000 in punitive damages).  See also Sharma v. ANZ Banking Group 
(New  Zealand)  Limited,  [1992]  6  PRNZ  386,  390  (stating  in  response  to  plaintiff’s  claim  for 
NZ$900,000 in punitive damages that “the claim is simply beyond the kind of scale contemplated 
as acceptable in this country”); Auckland City Council v. Blundell, [1986] 1 N.Z.L.R. 732; 1986 
NZLR  LEXIS  479,  *24 (stating  in  response  to  plaintiff’s  claim  for  NZ$500,000  in  punitive 
damages  that    the  claim  was  grossly  excessive  and  that  even  NZ$50,000  would  not  serve  the 
function  of  punitive  damages).    Some  plaintiffs  have  asserted  claims  for  punitive  damages  at 
amounts sufficient to bring their claims within the jurisdiction of the High Court.  See H v. R, 1995 
NZFLR LEXIS at * 25; G v. G, 1996 NZFLR LEXIS 42.
156. Wellington Newspapers Ltd v. Dealers Guide Ltd., [1984] 2 N.Z.L.R. 66, 72 (C.A. 
Wellington).
157.  See  Duffy  v.  Attorney  General  (High  Court,  Wellington,  A  352/82,  3  February Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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than NZ$15,000 could be attributed to compensatory damages, and, 
therefore, the award of punitive damages totaled NZ$45,000.  The court 
thought that amount was excessive and was the result of the jury being 
faced with “a plaintiff who made a sympathetic impression, a defendant of 
unpopular image, and an inflammatory set of circumstances.”
158  The court 
determined that the total award, including punitive damages should not 
have exceeded NZ$20,000.
159
Because of the efforts by New Zealand courts to control the size of 
punitive damages awards, one commentator notes that claims for punitive 
damages have become impracticable from an economic standpoint.  The 
size of such awards typically is insufficient to cover plaintiff’s legal fees 
and other expenses.
160
D. The United States
The most widespread use of punitive damages is in the United 
States, where the award of exemplary relief is governed both by state and 
federal law.  However, the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution constrains unreasonably large awards of punitive damages.
161
In the United States, punitive damages typically serve two 
purposes: (1) to punish a party from engaging in wrongful, malicious, or 
outrageous conduct, and (2) to deter that party and others from engaging in 
the prohibited behavior in the future.
162  A few states allow what they call 
exemplary relief only to compensate the claimant when damages are 
difficult to ascertain, and not to punish the defendant.
163
Punitive damages are allowed in a great majority of states, 
1986, Eichelbaum J.) at 1-2 .
158. Id.
159. See id. at 7
160. See Manning, supra note 135, at 184.
161. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003); BMW of 
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
162.  See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001); 
see  also  Cass  R.  Sunstein  et  al.,  Assessing  Punitive  Damages  (with  Notes  on  Cognition  and 
Valuation  in  Law),  197  YALE  L.J.  2071,  2074  (1998).    But  see  Anthony  J.  Sebok,  What  Did 
Punitive Damages Do?  Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163 (2003). 
163.  See Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, 242 N.W.2d. 775 (Mich. App. 1976), aff’d as
modified, 364 N.W.2d 600 (Mich. 1984); see also Wright Titus, Inc. v. Swafford, 133 S.W.2d 287 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1939).Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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although the circumstances permitting such relief vary greatly.
164  Punitive 
damages have been permitted in actions involving torts, contracts, 
property, admiralty, employment, and family law.
165
Five states either prohibit the award of punitive damages altogether 
or severely restrict their use.  Nebraska and Washington do not allow 
punitive damages.
166  Louisiana, New Hampshire and Massachusetts also 
prohibit punitive damages, unless they are expressly authorized by 
statute.
167
Unlike Australia and New Zealand, the majority of American states 
allow punitive damages where the defendant has already been subject to 
criminal proceedings for the same conduct giving rise to the claim for 
damages or where the defendant’s wrongful conduct would expose him or 
her to criminal sanctions.
168  There are two justifications for this rule.  The 
first is that the prohibition on double jeopardy
169 applies only to multiple 
criminal prosecutions and thus such actions do not preclude punitive 
damages.
170  The second is that the civil and criminal penalties serve 
different purposes: criminal sanctions redress a wrong to the public, 
164. See generally BLATT, supra note 4, at 236-552.
It  should  be  noted  that  States  are  currently  divided  on  whether  arbitrators  have  the 
authority to award punitive damages.  Compare Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 
1976) (prohibiting arbitrators from awarding punitive damages), with Complete Interiors, Inc. v. 
Behan, 588 So.2d 48, 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that arbitrators may not award punitive 
damages absent express provision in contract authorizing this relief) and with Baker v. Sadick, 162 
Cal. App. 3d 618, 631 (4th Dist. 1984) (ruling that arbitrators may award punitive damages unless 
the parties expressly prohibit its award).  In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., the 
Supreme  Court  ruled  that    parties  are  generally  free  to  define  the  scope  of  their  arbitration 
agreement  and  that  Federal  Arbitration  Act  ensures  that  such  an  agreement  will  be  enforced 
according  to  its  terms  notwithstanding  state  law  limits  on  arbitrability.    See  Mastrobuono  v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 55-64 (1995). 
165.  See 2 SCHLUETER &  REDDEN, supra note 17, at § 20; JOHN J.KIRCHER & CHRISTINE 
M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW & PRACTICE  5-1, 6-1, 13-1 (2d ed. 2000).
166. See Miller v. Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472 (Neb. 1975); Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. 
Prod., 436 P.2d 186 (Wash.1968).
167.  See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1986); McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 
143 So. 383 (La. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 661 (1932); Karavokiros v. Indiana Motor Bus Co., 
524 F. Supp. 385 (ED La. 1981); USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp.,  467 N.E.2d 1271, 1284 
(Mass. 1984).  Michigan allows exemplary relief if they are compensatory in nature.  See Peisner v. 
Detroit Free Press, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 600, 603 (1984).
168. See KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 165, at § 3.:2 (citing cases).
169. See U.S. Const. amend. V (stating “nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offense or be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”).
170.  See  E.F.  Hutton  &  Co.,  Inc.  v.  Anderson,  596  P.2d  413  (Col.  1979); Olson v. 
Walker, 781 P.2d 1015 (Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1989).Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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whereas punitive damages in a civil action to redress a wrong to a private 
party.
171
With respect to determining the amount of punitive damages, the 
practice has been to give the jury broad discretion.
172  Specifically, under 
the traditional approach, once it is determined that the conduct justifies an 
award punitive damages, the jury determines the amount, “consider[ing] 
the gravity of wrong and the need to deter similar conduct.”
173 And, as 
explained below, that determination is then reviewed by the trial judge and 
appellate courts.  
A number of states limit the amount of punitive damages that may 
be awarded.
174 For example, Alabama and Georgia place a cap on awards 
of punitive damages at $250,000.
175  New Jersey limits punitive damages 
to five times compensatory damages or $350,000, whichever is greater.
176
Oklahoma limits punitive damages in two out of three categories of cases:
Category I.  Where the jury finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that . . . [t]he defendant has been guilty of reckless 
disregard for the rights of others . . . the jury . . . may award 
punitive damages in an amount not to exceed the greater of: 
171. See Wittman v. Gilson, 530 N.E.2d 514 (NY 1988); Moody v. Payne, 355 So. 2d 
116 (Ala. 1978).
172. See Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885) (staing, with respect 
to determining the amount of punitive damages, “[t]he discretion of the jury in such cases is not 
controlled by any very definite rules; yet the wisdom of allowing such additional damages to be 
given is attested by the long continuance of the practice”); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN  ET  AL., 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 3 (2002) (finding “the instructions presented to jurors for 
determination of the appropriate punitive damages verdict are extremely vague and employ terms 
that are largely undefined”).
173. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991).  Commentators also note 
that some states permit juries to consider in determining the amount of punitive damages to be 
awarded: (1) the possibility of criminal punishment, (2) the amount of compensatory damages, and 
(3) the expense and attorneys’ fees incurred by the plaintiff.  See 1 KIRCHER & WISEMAN,, supra
note 165, § 5:23, at 5-175-77.
174. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-4 (1999) (stating punitive damages may not be 
more than times compensatory damages or $50,000, whichever is greater); TEX. CIV. PRAC & REM. 
CODE ANN. §41.008 (2001)  (limiting in certain actions punitive damages to $200,000 or two times 
the  economic damages and up to $750,000 in additional non-economic damages, whichever is 
greater); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (1987)  (imposing $350,000 cap on punitive damages); see 
also NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005(1) (1991) (limiting punitive damages in certain cases to three times 
the amount of compensatory damages if the compensatory damages are less than $100,000).
175. See ALA CODE § 6-11-21 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(g) (1997).
176. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.14 (1995) (limiting punitive damages to five times 
compensatory damages or $350,000, whichever is greater).Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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(a) One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000), or (b) the 
amount of actual damages awarded.
Category II.  Where the jury finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that . . . [t]he defendant has acted intentionally 
and with malice towards others . . . the jury . . . may award 
punitive damages in an amount not to exceed the greater of: 
(a) Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000), (b) twice 
the amount of actual damages awarded, or (c) the increased 
financial benefit derived by the defendant . . . as a direct 
result of the conduct causing injury to the plaintiff and 
other persons or entities.
Category III.  Where the jury finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that . . . [t]he defendant has acted intentionally 
and with malice towards others . . . and the court finds . . . 
that there is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant . . . acted intentionally and with malice and 
engaged in conduct life-threatening to humans, the jury . . . 
may award punitive damages in any amount the jury deems 
appropriate . . . .
177
On the federal level, a number of statutes explicitly authorize the 
award of punitive relief for specific violations.
178  The Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, for example, provides that a court may award punitive 
damages when a consumer reporting agency willfully fails to comply with 
the requirements imposed by the Act.
179  In addition, various other statutes 
permit treble damages, including the Clayton Act, the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), and the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).
180
Conversely, a number of federal statutes, such as the Foreign Sovereign 
177. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1 (West Supp. 2003).
178.  See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1994); Fair Housing Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (1994); see also Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne Co., Inc., 670 F.2d 
575,  581-82  (5th  Cir.  1982)  (holding  treble  damages  are  available  under  antitrust  laws),  cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982); Riley v. Empire Airlines, 823 F. Supp. 1016, 1023  (N.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(permitting punitive damages in action for wrongful discharge under Railway Labor Act); Woods 
v. New Jersey Dep’t of Educ., 796 F. Supp. 767, 776  (D.N.J. 1992) (ruling that language in 
Individual with Disabilities Education Act authorizes claim for punitive damages). 
179.  See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (1994).
180. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization  Act,  18  U.S.C.  §  1964(c)  (1994);  Comprehensive  Environmental  Response 
Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3)(1994).Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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Immunities Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act, expressly preclude 
awards of punitive damages.
181
For over 200 years, the Supreme Court declined to place any 
constitutional limits on jury-awards of punitive damages.
182  The Court 
based this hands-off policy on the historic recognition of punitive damages 
in the United States and England.
183  Then, starting in the mid-1990s, it 
issued a number of decisions limiting awards of punitive damages and 
setting forth procedures for courts to follow in reviewing such awards.
184
The first case to invalidate a jury award of punitive damages on the 
ground that it was grossly excessive and exceeded constitutional limits 
was BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.
185  In that case, Gore alleged 
that BMW committed fraud under Alabama law by failing to disclose that 
the new car he purchased from an authorized dealer had been damaged and 
repainted prior to its sale.  A jury awarded Gore $4,000 in compensatory 
damages and $4 million in punitive damages, finding that BMW’s actions 
constituted gross, oppressive or malicious fraud.
186  BMW appealed to the 
Alabama Supreme Court, which rejected BMW’s claim that the award was 
unconstitutionally excessive.  Nevertheless, it reduced the punitive 
damages to $2 million, ruling that the jury improperly calculated the award 
181.    See  Federal  Tort  Claims  Act,  28  U.S.C.  §  2674  (1994);  Foreign  Sovereign 
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1994).
182. See, e.g., St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 
(1919) (affirming an award of $75 punitive damages and $25 in attorneys’ fees against a railroad 
that collected sixty-six cents more than the fare from two passengers); Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 
266,  305  (1878)  (upholding  punitive  damage  award  in  false  imprisonment  action);  Day  v. 
Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1852) (affirming punitive damage award against defendants 
in trespass action).
183. See Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, (1885) ([I]n England and in this 
country, [damages] have been allowed in excess of compensation, whenever malice, gross neglect, 
or oppression has caused or accompanied the commission of the injury complained of.”); Day, 54 
U.S. at 371 (“It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in actions of trespass and all 
actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive 
damages upon a defendant . . . .”).
184. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. 
Gore,  517 U.S. 559 (1996); Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001); 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
185. 517 U.S. at 559.
186. See id. at 564-65.  BMW claimed that the damage to Gore’s car only amounted to 
$601.37, approximately 1.5% of its list price.  The jury assessed actual damages based on the 
statements of a former BMW dealer, who testified that the second paint job decreased the value of 
the BMW by 10%.  Id.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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by basing it on BMW’s conduct in other states.
187  The United States 
Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court initially noted that a state may impose punitive 
damages to further its “legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct 
and deterring its repetition.”
188  As a result, the Court stated that the 
inquiry to determine whether a punitive damages award is 
unconstitutionally excessive begins with identifying the interests that a 
punitive damages award is designed to serve.  The Court determined that 
while Alabama had a legitimate interest in awarding punitive damages in 
this case – preventing manufacturers from engaging in deceptive trade 
practices – such damages could be imposed only within its jurisdiction.  
To impose economic sanctions for conduct outside the state, the Court 
opined, would improperly punish BMW for conduct that was lawful in 
other jurisdictions and that would have no effect on Alabama.  The Court 
thus agreed with the portion of Alabama Supreme Court’s decision that the 
jury had improperly calculated the amount of punitive damages because it 
based its award in large part on conduct outside the State.
189
The Court next turned to whether the reduced award was 
unconstitutionally excessive.  The Court announced three guideposts to be 
used in reviewing punitive damages awards: (1) the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct, (2) the ratio between 
compensatory and punitive damages, and (3) the difference between the 
punitive damages award and the penalties that could be imposed for 
similar conduct.
190
The Court noted that the first guidepost, the degree of 
reprehensibility, was the most important indicium of reasonableness.
191
Applying this factor, the Court determined that BMW’s conduct was not 
sufficiently reprehensible to justify a $2 million punitive damages award.  
187. See id. at 567.
188. Id. at 568.
189. See id. at 568-75.  While Alabama was permitted to impose punitive damages to 
protect its own consumers, the basic tenets of state sovereignty forbid it to punish a corporation for 
its lawful conduct in other jurisdictions.  Id. at 571.  However, BMW’s out-of-state conduct could 
be used to determine the degree of reprehensibility of its conduct.  Id. at 573 n.20.
190. See id. at 575.  Justice O’Connor had advocated similar criteria in Browning-Ferris 
Industries of Vermont  v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 297-98 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) and TXO Prod. Corp v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481 
(1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
191. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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The Court explained that the harm to Gore was purely economic, as 
opposed to physical, and that there was no evidence of “deliberate false 
statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or concealment of evidence of 
improper motive.”
192
Turning to the second guidepost, the Court stated that the punitive 
damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the actual harm inflicted 
on the plaintiff.
193  While the Court refused to adopt a simple 
mathematical formula to determine the constitutionality of a punitive 
damages award, it noted that the $2 million punitive damages award 
against BMW was 500 times the actual harm to Gore, and concluded that 
it “surely raise[s] a suspicious judicial eyebrow.”
194
The Court then addressed the third guidepost, which compares the 
punitive damages award and the sanctions that could be imposed by the 
state for comparable misconduct.  The Court explained that, in applying 
this factor, a reviewing court should “accord ‘substantial deference’ to the 
legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at 
issue.”
195  In the instant case, the Court stated, the maximum civil penalty 
for deceptive trade practices in Alabama was $2,000 – far less than the $2 
million punitive damages award.  The Court also noted that “[t]he sanction 
imposed in this case cannot be justified on the ground that it was necessary 
to deter future misconduct without considering whether less drastic 
remedies could be expected to achieve that goal.”
196
Based on the application of the three guideposts, the Court 
concluded that the award was grossly excessive and exceeded the 
constitutional limit.  It thus reversed the Alabama Supreme Court’s 
judgment and remanded the case for that court to decide whether to grant 
BMW a new trial or to independently determine a constitutionally 
appropriate award.
197
The Supreme Court clarified the Gore guideposts in State Farm 
192.  Id.  at  579.    The  Court  noted  that  conduct  causing  economic  injury  could  be 
extremely reprehensible in some cases, especially when the defendant is financially vulnerable, but 
that BMW’s conduct in this case was not.
193. See id. at 580.
194. Id. at 582-83 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481 
(1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
195.  Gore,  517  U.S.  at  583  (quoting  Browning  Ferris  Indus.  of  Vt.,  Inc.  v.  Kelco 
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
196. Gore, 517 U.S. at 584.
197. See id. at 586.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell.
198  There, the 
Campbells alleged that State Farm’s actions in settling an insurance claim
against the Campbells constituted bad faith, fraud, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.
199  A jury awarded the Campbells $2.5 
million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages.  
The trial judge then reduced the damages to $1 million in compensatory 
damages and $25 million in punitive damages.  Both parties appealed to 
the Utah Supreme Court.  After purporting to apply the guidelines set forth 
in Gore, that court reinstated the $145 million punitive damages award.
200
The United States Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that grossly 
excessive punitive damages violate the Due Process Clause because they 
further no legitimate state purpose and constitute an arbitrary deprivation 
of property.  The Court noted that civil awards of punitive damages were 
of particular concern because, while they serve a purpose similar to 
criminal fines, the parties subject to awards of punitive damages were not 
accorded the same protections given to defendants in criminal 
proceedings.  The Court further noted that because juries are often 
accorded wide discretion in setting the amount of the punitive damages 
award, there is a potential for juries to use their verdicts to express their 
bias against the defendants, who are often nonresidents without strong 
local ties.
201
The Court next turned to Gore’s three guideposts for reviewing 
punitive damages awards: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the 
misconduct, (2) the ratio between actual or potential harm and the punitive 
198. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
199. See id. at 1517-18.  The case arose after Curtis Campbell caused a car accident, 
killing  Todd  Ospital  and  permanently  disabling  Robert  Slusher.    Ospital’s  estate  and  Slusher 
offered to settle for 50,000, Campbell’s policy limit.  Although State Farm knew the accident was 
Campbell’s fault, they refused to settle, and proceeded to trial.  The jury found Campbell entirely at 
fault  and  returned  a verdict for $185,849.  State Farm thereafter refused to pay the difference 
between the proposed settlement amount and the jury verdict or to post a supersedes bond so that 
Campbell could appeal the award. In fact, at this point, representatives for State Farm even told the 
Campbells to “put for sale signs on your property to get things moving.”  Campbell then retained 
his own counsel and appealed the verdict.  After the appeal was denied, State Farm paid the entire 
judgment.  Id.
200. See id.  The court found that State Farm’s conduct was reprehensible, would only be 
punished once per every 50,000 incidents, and was comparable to the various civil and criminal 
penalties State Farm could face.  Id.
201. See id. at 1520.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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damage award, and (3) the difference between the sanctions for 
comparable conduct and the punitive damages award.
202  It then elaborated 
on the first guidepost.  The Court stated that the defendant’s 
reprehensibility can be determined by looking to the following factors: (i) 
whether the harm caused was physical or economic, (ii) whether the 
defendant’s conduct evinced an indifference to the safety or health of 
others, (iii) whether the plaintiff was experiencing financial difficulty or 
was otherwise vulnerable, (iv) whether the conduct at issue was an isolated 
incident or was repeatedly performed by the defendant, and (v) whether 
the defendant’s conduct exhibited malice, trickery or deceit.  The Court 
explained that the existence of only one of these factors may not be a 
sufficient basis to award punitive damages and, if none of these factors are 
present, such an award would be constitutionally suspect.  The Court 
added that punitive damages should only be awarded if the compensatory 
damages are inadequate to punish the  defendant and deter the defendant 
and others from repeating it.
203
While the Court found State Farm’s conduct blameworthy enough 
to impose some punitive damages, it stated that a smaller award would 
satisfy Utah’s dual goals of deterrence and retribution.
204  Here, Utah was 
punishing State Farm not only for its actions in the state, but also for its 
nationwide practices, which the Court specifically ruled improper in Gore.  
Further, the jury award was incorrectly based on evidence of other conduct 
by State Farm that was objectionable, yet dissimilar.  Therefore, because 
the Campbells did not present evidence of similar conduct, State Farm’s 
reprehensibility could be properly based only on its interaction with the 
Campbells.
205
The Court subsequently turned to the second guidepost and stated 
that courts must ensure that the punitive damages award is both reasonable 
and proportionate to both the amount of harm to the plaintiff and the 
compensatory damages recovered.  As in its previous cases, the Court 
explicitly declined to adopt a bright-line ratio that a punitive damages 
202. See id. at 1521 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)).
203. See Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1521.
204. See id. at 1522.
205. See id. at 1523 (“A defendant’s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon 
which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages.”).  The Court noted 
that recidivist defendants may be more reprehensible than first-time offenders, but that punitive 
damage awards should be limited to only the conduct charged.  The Court also found that the 
award was erroneously based on twenty years of conduct by State Farm.  Id. at 1524.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
40
award cannot exceed.
206  However, this time the Court stated that “few 
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between compensatory and punitive 
damages, to a significant degree, will likely satisfy due process . . . .”
207
The Court further noted that a higher ratio may be constitutional if an 
especially malevolent act caused only a small amount of harm, and that a 
lower ratio would be constitutional if the compensatory damages are 
considerable.  The Court suggested that if compensatory damages are 
substantial, then the Constitution may limit recovery to a doubling of those 
damages.  Applying the guidepost, the Court opined there was a 
presumption the $145 million punitive damages award was invalid 
because of the 145 to 1 ratio, because the $1 million compensatory 
damages award for a year and a half of emotional distress was substantial, 
and because the Campbells had suffered only minor economic injuries.
208
The Court also dismissed as improper the Utah Supreme Court’s assertion 
that State Farm’s substantial assets provided a basis for upholding the 
excessive award.  The Court opined that an unconstitutional award is not 
justified because the defendant is wealthy.
209
With respect to the third guidepost, the Court noted that in the past 
it had looked to criminal penalties that could be imposed because, among 
other things, they illustrate the seriousness with which the state views the 
misconduct.
210   The Court cautioned that this guidepost should not be 
taken to mean that punitive damages could be used as a substitute for 
206. See id. at 1524.  Before Campbell, the Court had refuse to draw any line between 
constitutional  and  unconstitutional  punitive  damage  awards,  instead  relying  on  general 
considerations of “reasonableness.”  See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) 
(“We  have  consistently  rejected  the  notion  that  the  constitutional  line  is  marked  by  a  simple 
mathematical  formula,  even  one  that  compares  actual  and  potential  damages  to  the  punitive 
award.”); see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (“We need not, and 
indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the 
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case.”).
207. Id. The Court added that “[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with 
due process, while still achieving the State’s goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with 
ratios in the range of 500 to 1 or, in this case, 145 to 1.”  Id.
208.  See id.  at  1524-25.    In  fact,  the  Court  noted  that  the  compensatory  award  for 
emotional distress already contained a punitive element.  Id. at 1525 (citing Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 908, cmt. c, at 466 (1977)).
209. See id. at 1525.  Cf. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21-22 (adopting the “financial position of 
the defendant” as factor to determine whether a punitive damage award is reasonable); see also
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 463 n.28 (1993) (admitting evidence of 
defendants wealth based on “well settled law”).
210. See Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1526.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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criminal punishment, which may be imposed only after proceedings where 
the defendant is accorded more protections and where there exists a higher 
standard of proof.
211  The Court then noted that the comparable penalty 
under Utah law for State Farm’s conduct was a $10,000 fine for fraud.  
That amount, the Court stated, was “dwarfed” by the punitive damages 
award of $145 million.
212
As in Gore, applying the guideposts led the Court to conclude that 
the $145 million punitive damages award “was neither reasonable nor 
proportionate to the wrong committed, and it was an irrational and 
arbitrary deprivation of the property of the defendant.”
213
There are two other noteworthy Supreme Court decisions on 
punitive damages:  Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg and  Cooper Industries v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.
214 In Oberg, the Court held that a state’s 
failure to provide defendants with a meaningful way to obtain postverdict 
judicial review of the amount of a punitive damages award violated the 
Due Process Clause because there was no protection against arbitrary and 
inaccurate adjudications that deprive a party of liberty or property.
215  In 
Leatherman, the Court ruled that whether the Gore guideposts have been 
met must be reviewed de novo on appeal.
216
In short, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions unambiguously 
211. See id.
212.  See id.    Previously,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Utah  declared  that  the  award  was 
comparable to similar statutory sanctions because State Farm could have lost their business license 
or been subject to imprisonment.   The United States Supreme Court dismissed these findings as 
mere speculation, asserting they were erroneously based on out-of-state and dissimilar conduct.  Id.
213. Id.
214.  See  Honda  Motor  Co.  v.  Oberg,  512  U.S.  415  (1994);  Cooper  Industries  v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
215. See Oberg, 512 U.S. at 420, 432.  In that case, Oberg sued Honda after his three-
wheeled  all-terrain  vehicle  flipped,  permanently  injuring  him.    The  jury  awarded  Oberg 
$919,390.30 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages.  Because Oberg was 
20%  at  fault,  the  compensatory damages were reduced to $735,512.31.  The Oregon Court of 
Appeals  and  Oregon  Supreme  Court  upheld  the  award,  based  on  an  Oregon  statute  which 
prohibited judicial review of the amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury unless there was no 
evidence to support the verdict. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.   Id. at 418-19 (quoting Oberg 
v. Honda Motor Co., 316 Ore. 263, 285). 
216. See Leatherman, 532 U.S. at 432-43. There, Leatherman alleged that Cooper had 
engaged in trade dress infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising.  A jury awarded 
Leatherman $50,000 in compensatory damages and $ 4.5 million in punitive damages.  The district 
court upheld the award and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling inter alia that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion when it determined that the punitive damages award was constitutional 
under the Gore test.  The Supreme Court reversed.  Id.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
42
illustrate that the Court is deeply concerned with both the process for 
awarding punitive damages as well as the size of the awards.  It has held 
that procedural due process mandates that safeguards be in place to ensure 
fairness in the awarding of punitive damages.  Furthermore, it has ruled 
that substantive due process prohibits grossly excessive awards of punitive 
damages.  Thus, it is likely that American courts in the coming years will 
more closely scrutinize punitive damages awards to ensure (by United 
States standards) that they are reasonable and proportionate to the wrong 
committed.
E. Canada
In formulating its procedures and rules on punitive damages, 
Canada has often looked to the experience in other countries, particularly 
the United States and England.
217  The result has been that punitive 
damages are available in a broad range of actions in Canada, and they 
appear to be increasing in number and size.
218  In fact, in July 2003, a jury 
awarded a record CAN$2 million in punitive damages.
219
The purpose of awarding punitive damages in Canada is to punish, 
deter and show the court’s disapproval of the defendant’s actions.
220
Today, all of the provinces and territories in Canada permit the award of 
punitive damages.  This was not always the case.  Traditionally, its 
availability depended on whether the province or territory whose law 
governed the dispute adopted a civil or common law system.  In the 
common law provinces and territories, punitive damages has been an 
established remedy.
221  By contrast, in Quebec, a civil law jurisdiction, 
217. See, e.g., Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595; see also Allen M. Linden, 
The American Influence on Canadian Tort Law, 50 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 407, 419-20 (2002).
218. See Whiten, 1 S.C.R. at 621; Bruce Feldthusen, Punitive Damages: Hard Choices 
and High Stakes, 1998 N.Z. L. REV. 741, 742.
219.  See,  Stephanie  Levitz  and  Haley  Mick,  Jury  Breaks  Punitive  Damages  Record; 
Awards  $2  Million  to  Mushroom  Farmer,  (July  17,  2003)  at
http://www.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2003/07/17/138939-cp.html (last visited on July 21, 2003).
220. See Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, 1208 (explaining that 
punitive damages are awarded to punish defendant and to deter defendant and others from engaging 
in such conduct, and not to compensate plaintiff).
221. See S.M. WADDAMS, THE LAW OF DAMAGES 562-92 (1983); JOHN W. MORRISON, 
THE  INSURABILITY  OF  PUNITIVE  DAMAGES  app.  B  (1985);  Donna  Lea  Hawley,  Punitive  and 
Aggravated  Damages  in  Canada,  18  ALTA.  L.  REV.  485,  492  (1980);  see  also  H.L.  Weiss 
Forwarding Ltd. v. Omnus [1975] 5 N.R. 511 (S.C.C.); S. v. Mundy [1969] 9 D.L.R. (3d) 446 Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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punitive damages were not awarded in private actions
222 until 1991 when 
Quebec revised its civil code to allow the awarding of punitive 
damages.
223
Like Australia and New Zealand, Canada has declined to limit the 
scope of punitive damages to the categories set out in Lord Devlin's 
opinion in Rookes v. Barnard; namely cases involving abuse of power by 
the government, suits concerning torts committed for profit, and statutory 
claims which expressly allow for such damages.
224  In Vorvis v. Insurance 
Corp. of British Columbia, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled, that by 
rejecting the categorical approach, punitive damages may be awarded in 
any case when the defendant's conduct has been harsh, vindictive, 
reprehensible, or malicious.
225  In Hill v. Church of Scientology, it added 
that “punitive damages should only be awarded in those circumstances 
where the combined award of general and aggravated damages would be 
insufficient to achieve the goal of punishment and deterrence.”
226
Punitive damages are primarily awarded in actions involving 
intentional torts, such as defamation,
227 assault,
228 and false 
imprisonment,
229 and only where the defendant has engaged in 
“exceptionally objectionable conduct.”
230  In addition, they may be 
(Ont. Co. Ct.); Parkes v. Howard Johnson Restaurants Ltd. [1970] 74 W.W.R. 255 (B.C.S.C.); 
Heddinger v. Calgary [1992] 2 Alta. L.R. (3d ) 224 (Q.B.); Epstein v. Cressey Dev. Corp. [1992] 
65 B.C.L.R. (2d) 52 (C.A.); Mount Baker Enter. Ltd. v. Big Rig Collision, Inc. [1990] 64 Man. R. 
(2d) 180 (Q.B.), aff’d, 68 Man. R.2d 269 (C.A.); Thompson v. Celebration Saloons Ltd. [1992] 
104 Sask. R. 138 (Q.B.); G.E. Cox Ltd. v. Adams [1979] 26 N.B.R. (2d) 49 (S.C. App. Div.).
222. See G.H.L. Fridman, Punitive Damages in Tort, 48 CAN. BAR REV. 373, 381 n.47 
(1970).
223. See Civil Code, S.Q., ch. 64, art. 1621 (Que.) (1991); see Patenaude v. Roy [1970] 
123 D.L.R. (4th) 78; Lanctôt v. GiguPre [1991] R.J.Q. 123 (S.C.); Ouellette v. Forgeot [1992] 
R.R.A. 940 (Que.); Samuelli v. Jouhannet [1994] R.J.Q. 152 (S.C.).
224. See Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085, 1104-05.
225. See id. 1 S.C.R. at 1085.
226. See Hill v. Church of Scientology, 2 S.C.R. at 1208.
227.  See, e.g., Ross v. Lamport [1956] S.C.R. 366; Goodman v. Kidd [1986] N.W.T.R. 
94 (S.C.); Kolewaski v. Island Properties, Ltd. [1983] 56 N.S.R. (2d) 475 (T.D.).
228.  See, e.g., Moore v. Slater [1979] 101 D.L.R. (3d) 176 (B.C.S.C.); Karpow v. Shave 
[1975] 2 W.W.R. 159 (Alta. S.C.T.D.); Kingsmith v. Denton [1977] 3 A.R. 315 (S.C.T.D.).
229.  See, e.g., Lang v. Burch [1982] 140 D.L.R. (3d) 325 (Sask. CA.); Dalsin, 63 D.L.R. 
(3d) at 565; Hayward v. F.W. Woolworth Co. Ltd. [1979] 98 D.L.R. (3d) 345 (Nfld. S.C.T.D.).  
Punitive damages also have been awarded in cases involving nuisance and conspiracy.  See, e.g., 
Culp  v.  Township  of  East  York  [1956]  O.R.  983  (H.C.J.),  aff’d,  9  D.L.R.  (2d)  749  (C.A.); 
McKinnon v. F.W. Woolworth Co. Ltd. [1968] 70 D.L.R. (2d) 280 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.).
230. See Vorvis, 1 S.C.R. at 1104-05.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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awarded in negligence  actions, but such awards are rare.
231  Punitive 
damages also are available in breach of contract cases when the injury 
caused to the plaintiff is an independent actionable wrong.
232
A number of jurisdictions expressly prohibit punitive damages in 
survival actions on the grounds that such damages do not represent actual 
pecuniary loss to the deceased and would unjustly enrich the estate.
233
Further, punitive damages may not be awarded in a claim arising out of a 
statutory right unless the statute expressly provides for such remedy.
234
Punitive damages may also be awarded even if the defendant has 
been punished in a criminal action.  Canadian courts treat prior criminal 
punishment as a factor to consider when assessing punitive damages.
235
For example, in Buxbaum v. Buxbaum, the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled 
that punitive damages could be awarded even though the defendant had 
been sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 
25 years for the same conduct. In that case, the defendant was found liable 
231.    See  Robitaille  v.  Vancouver  Hockey  Club,  [1979]  19  B.C.L.R  158,  1979 
CarswellBC 477, ¶ 85 (holding that punitive damages can be awarded for negligence); Coughlin v. 
Kuntz, [1989] 42 B.C.L.R.2d 108, 2 W.W.R. 737 (allowing exemplary damages for negligence); 
see also Linden, supra note 217, at 420 (stating that punitive damages in negligence cases are “still 
very rare”).  There is a split of authority on whether the negligent conduct had to be directed at the 
plaintiff.  Compare Kaytor v. Lion’s Driving Range, 35 D.L.R.2d 426, 430 (negligent conduct has 
to be “consciously directed against the person, reputation, or property of the plaintiff”) with Vlchek 
v. Koshel, 52 D.L.R.4th 371, 375 (“The fact that the conduct was specifically and consciously 
directed at the plaintiff is a factor to consider, but specific intent is not a prerequisite”).
232. See Vorvis, 1S.C.R. at 1107; Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, 637-39; 
Nantel v. Parisien [1981] 18 C.C.L.T. 79 (Ont. H.C.J.); Cornell v. Pfizer C&G Inc. [1981] 23 
C.P.C. 286 (Ont. H.C.); Brown v. Waterloo Regional Bd. of Commrs. of Police [1982] 136 D.L.R. 
(3d) 49, 37 O.R. (2d) 277 (H.C.J.); see also, Anthony J. Saunders, Recent Developments in the Law 
of Punitive Damages (presented to the March 2001 Continuing Legal Education Society of B.C. 
Seminar,  Damages  Update  2001)  at 
http://www.guildyule.com/Downloads/PAP%20CLE%20Recent%20Development%20in%20the%
20Law%20of%20Punitive%20Damages.pdf. David I. Bristow, The Art of Proving Damages for 
Breach of Tender, 10 CONSTR. L. REP. (3d) 158, at § 5 (2000).
233.  See SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS ACT, Alta., § 5; Nfld., § 4(6); N.B., § 5; N.S., § 3(a); 
P.E.I., § 5(a); Yukon, § 6(1); TRUSTEE ACT, Man., § 55(1).
234.  See CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIC DIGEST § 38 (3
rd ed. 1995); see also Worobel Estate 
v. Worobel [1988] 67 O.R. (2d) 151 (H.C.).
235. See, e.g., Buxbaum v. Buxbaum, [1997] O.J. No. 5166, 1997 Carswell Ont. 4922 
(Ont. C.A.); G (E.D.) v. D (S.) [1993] 77 B.C.L.R. 2d 106 (B.C. C.A.); Pollard v. Gibson [1986] 1 
Y.R. 167 (Y.T. S.C.); Joanisse v. Y. (D.) [1995] 15 B.C.L.R. (3d) 224 (B.C. S.C.); Canada v. 
Lukasik [1985] 18 D.L.R. (4th) 245 (Alta. Q.B.); Wittig v. Wittig [1986] 53 Sask. R. 138 (Sask. 
Q.B.).    See  also  Ontario  Law  Commission,  Report  on  Exemplary  Damages  13  (1991) 
(recommending  that  courts  “should  be  entitled  to  consider  the  fact  and  adequacy  of any prior 
penalty imposed in any criminal or other similar proceeding brought against the defendant”).Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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for intentional wrongdoing and negligence for injury that resulted from the 
plaintiff being exposed to the murder of his wife.  The court, however, 
reduced the punitive damage award from CAN$130,000 to CAN$65,000 
in light of the prior punishment of the defendant.
236
With respect to determining the amount of punitive damages to be 
awarded, traditionally juries were given broad discretion in fixing the 
award.
237  In light of increasing punitive damages awards, the Supreme 
Court, in Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., stated that juries should be 
instructed on the function of punitive damages and the factors to be used 
in determining the appropriate amount of such damages.  It then set forth 
eleven factors that juries should consider:
(1) Punitive damages are very much the exception rather 
than the rule.
(2) [Punitive damages are] imposed only if there has been 
high-handed, malicious, arbitrary or reprehensible 
misconduct that departs from the ordinary standard of 
decent behaviour.
(3) Where they are awarded, punitive damages should be 
assessed is an amount reasonably proportionate to such 
factors as the harm caused, the degree of the misconduct, 
the relative vulnerability of the plaintiff and any advantage 
or profit gained by the defendant . . . .
(4) [A]ny other fines or penalties suffered by the defendant 
for the misconduct in question [should be taken into 
account].
(5) Punitive damages are generally given only where the 
misconduct would otherwise be unpunished or where other 
penalties are or are likely to be inadequate to achieve the 
objectives of retribution, deterrence and denunciation.
(6) Their purpose is not to compensate the plaintiff . . . .
(7) [The purpose of punitive damages is] to give a 
defendant his or her just desert (retribution), to deter the 
defendant and others from similar misconduct in the future 
(deterrence), and to mark the community’s collective 
condemnation (denunciation) of what has happened.
236. See Buxbaum, 1997 Carswell Ont. at ¶ 6.
237. See Hill v. Church of Scientology, 2 S.C.R. at 1195-96.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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(8) Punitive damages are awarded only where 
compensatory damages, which to some extent are punitive, 
are insufficient to accomplish these objectives . . . .
(9) [T]hey are [to be] given in an amount that is no greater 
than necessary to rationally accomplish their purpose.
(10) While normally the state would be the recipient of any 
fine or penalty for misconduct, the plaintiff will keep 
punitive damages as a “windfall” in addition to 
compensatory damages.
(11) Judges and juries in our system have usually found that 
moderate awards of punitive damages, which inevitably 
carry a stigma in the broader community, are generally 
sufficient.
238
In recent years, punitive damages awards have increased 
significantly in Canada.
239  Before 1988, punitive damage awards were 
relatively modest, with the largest awards being approximately 
CAN$50,000.
240  By the mid-90s, there was one award exceeding CAN$1 
million and several exceeding CAN$100,000.
241  However, since then, as 
Justice Binnie noted in Whiten, “the awards have multiplied and escalated 
in amount.”
242  In fact, in July 2003, a Canadian jury ordered an insurance 
company to pay CAN$2 million in punitive damages for being 
“malicious” and “high-handed” in refusing to pay the plaintiff’s insurance 
claim after plaintiff’s farm burned down.
243  This award is reportedly the 
238. Whiten, 1 S.C.R. at 646 (emphasis in original).
239. See id. at 621.
240. See Bruce Feldthusen and Neil Vidmar, Exemplary Damage Claims in Ontario: and 
Empirical  Profile,  16  CAN  .BUS.  L.J.  162  (1990).  CAN$50,000  is  approximately  equal  to 
US$35,466,  based  on  a  conversion  rate  of  CAN$1=US$0.709319.    See
http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi.
241.  See  Claiborne  Indus.  v. National Bank of Can., 59 D.L.R.4th 533 (1989) (Ont. 
C.A.); Hill, 2 S.C.R. at 1130; MacDonald Estate v. Martin, 100 Man. R2d 1 (1994) (Manitoba 
C.A.);  Mustaji  v.  Tjin,  25  B.C.L.R.3d  220  (1996)  (B.C.S.C.)  see  also  Lewis  Klar,  Punitive 
Damages in Canada: Smith v. Megafood, 17 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 809, 822-26 (1995). 
CAN$1,000,000 is approximately equal to $709,319 and CAN$100,000 is approximately equal to 
US$70,932,  based  on  a  conversion  rate  of  CAN$1=US$0.709319.    See 
http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi.
242. Whiten, 1 S.C.R. at 621; see also Feldthusen, supra note 218, at 742.
243.  See  Stephanie  Levitz  and  Haley  Mick,  Jury  Breaks  Punitive  Damages  Record; 
Awards  $2  Million  to  Mushroom  Farmer,  (July  17,  2003)  at
http://www.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2003/07/17/138939-cp.html (last visited on July 21, 2003). 
CAN$2,000,000  is  approximately  equal  to  US$1,418,638,  based  on  a  conversion  rate  of Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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largest punitive damages award in Canadian history.
244
Canadian courts have more latitude than those in many other 
countries with respect to reviewing punitive damages awards for 
reasonableness.  As Justice Cory explained in Hill:
Unlike compensatory damages, punitive damages are not at 
large.  Consequently, courts have a much greater scope and 
discretion on appeal.  The appellate review should be based 
upon the court’s estimation as to whether the punitive 
damages serve a rational purpose.  In other words, was the 
misconduct of the defendant so outrageous that punitive 
damages were rationally required to act as a deterrence?
245
In determining whether an award of punitive damages is “rational,” 
the appellate court considers six factors.  The first is whether the award is 
proportionate to the defendant’s conduct. “The more reprehensible the 
conduct, the higher the rational limits to the potential award.”
246  The 
second consideration is whether the award is proportionate to the degree of 
the financial or other vulnerability of the plaintiff and the abuse of that 
vulnerability by the defendant.  Here, the focus is on whether the amount 
of the award was needed to deter the defendant from exploiting vulnerable 
parties.
247  The third factor is proportionate to the harm directed 
specifically at the plaintiff.
248  The fourth is whether the award is 
proportionate to the need for deterrence.  Here, a court may consider a 
CAN$1=US$0.709319.  See http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi.
244. See id.
245. Hill, 2 S.C.R. at 1208-09.
246. Whiten, 1 S.C.R. at 650-51.  The level of blameworthiness can be determined from 
seven factors:
(1) whether the misconduct was planned and deliberate;
(2) the intent and motive of the defendant;
(3)  whether  the  defendant  persisted  in  the  outrageous  conduct  for  over  a 
lengthy period of time;
(4) whether the defendant concealed or attempted to coverup its misconduct;
(5) the defendant’s awareness that what he or she was doing was wrong;
(6) whether the defendant profited from its misconduct; and
(7) whether the interest violated by the misconduct was known to be deeply 
personal to the plaintiff or a thing that was irreplaceable.
Id.
247. See id. at 652-53
248. See id at 653-54 (stating “[i]t would be irrational to provide the plaintiff with an 
excessive windfall arising out of a defendant’s scam of which the plaintiff was but a minor or 
peripheral victim”). Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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defendant’s financial resources to the extent that (i) it shows the defendant 
will experience financial hardship because of the punitive damages award, 
(ii) it illustrates that the defendant’s financial power enabled him or her to 
engage in the outrageous behavior, or (iii) it may “rationally” be concluded 
from the circumstances that a lesser award of punitive damages would fail 
to deter the defendant because of the defendant’s financial wealth.
249  The 
fifth factor is whether the award is proportionate to any civil or criminal 
penalties for the defendant’s misconduct.  Where the defendant has already 
been punished through civil or criminal proceedings, or is likely to face 
such proceedings, a court may lessen or eliminate altogether an award of 
punitive damages if the objectives of retribution, deterrence and 
denunciation have been or will be satisfied through other proceedings.
250
The sixth consideration is whether the award is proportionate to the 
advantage gained by the defendant.  This factor considers whether the 
punitive damages award is sufficient to ensure that the defendant does not 
profit from his or her wrongful behavior.
251
It also should be noted that, unlike the United States Supreme 
Court, the Supreme Court of Canada has rejected the use a ratio between 
compensatory damages and punitive damages as a factor to determine 
whether a punitive damages award is excessive.  The Court explained that 
“that relationship . . . is not even the most relevant because it puts the 
focus on the plaintiff’s loss rather than where it should be on the 
defendant’s misconduct.”
252
As in the United States, there appears to be little uniformity among 
Canadian appellate courts with respect to determining what is the 
appropriate size of punitive damages awards.
253  The degree of 
249. See id. at 654.
250. See id. at 655  (“The key point is that punitive damages are awarded ‘if, but only if’ 
all other penalties have been taken into account and found to be inadequate to achieve the objective 
of [punitive damages].”).
251. See id. at 656-57.
252. Id. at 657-58.
253.  See,  e.g.,  Lauscher,  1999  Carswell  Sask.  at  *164.  In  that  case,  the  plaintiff 
purchased a house for CAN$88,000.  It was later discovered that the house had been insulated with 
Urea  Formaldehyde  Foam,  which  was  banned  in  Canada.    Use  of  this  insulation  also  was 
prohibited  by  the  contract.    The  jury  awarded  CAN$271,000  in  damages,  which  included 
CAN$121,000 in compensatory damages and CAN$150,000 in punitive damages.  The trial judge 
reduced the award to  CAN$18,900 for the reduction in the value of the house.  The plaintiff 
appealed, arguing that the original damages award, including the punitive damages award, should 
be reinstated.  The Court of Appeal refused to re-enter the punitive element for two reasons.  First, Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
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inconsistency suggests that determining whether such damages are 
unreasonable in Canada is highly factual, based on the individual 
circumstances of each case.
For example, in Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., a jury found that the 
defendant insurance company deliberately and in bad faith refused to pay 
plaintiff’s claim under a fire insurance policy on the ground that the fire 
destroying the plaintiff’s farm was caused by arson, even though the 
evidence showed otherwise.
254  The jury awarded CAN$318,252 in 
compensatory damages and CAN$1 million in punitive damages.  The 
Ontario Court of Appeal reduced the punitive damages award to 
CAN$100,000, ruling this amount was sufficient to deter others and to 
ensure that insurance companies act with good faith.
255  The Supreme 
Court of Canada reversed and reinstated the jury’s CAN$1,000,000 
punitive damages award.  The court applied the above factors and 
determined that the evidence showed the defendant had acted maliciously 
and vindictively in maintaining its allegation of arson for two year even 
though its experts had concluded the fire was accidental and that the 
defendant abused its superior financial position to try to force the plaintiff 
to abandon her claim or to settle for less than the amount owed under the 
policy.  According to the court, the jury could have determined that the 
defendant’s conduct was so reprehensible that it needed to send “a 
powerful message of retribution, deterrence and denunciation . . . .”
256
The court concluded that based on the record the award “was not so 
disproportionate as to exceed the bounds of rationality.”
257
By contrast, in Colborne Capital Corp. v. 5427775 Alberta Ltd., 
the Alberta Court of Appeal vacated a CAN$1,000,000 award of punitive 
damages.
258  In that case, Colborne sued Stampeder Exploration claiming 
its rights of first refusal were violated when Stampeder purchased Westar 
Petroleum.  Stampeder counterclaimed that Colborne had engaged in a 
the plaintiffs had not claimed punitive damages.  Second, the court ruled that the CAN$150,000 
punitive damages award was “so inordinately high as to shock the conscience and sense of justice.” 
Id. at ¶¶ 13-19. See also Walker v. Darcy, [1999] 117 O.A.C. 367, 1999 Carswell Ont. 457, at ¶ 5 
(reducing punitive damages award from CAN$250,000 to CAN$5,000).
254. See Whiten, 1 S.C.R. at 605-14.
255. See id. 616.
256. Id. at 658-59.
257. Id. at 663.
258. See Colborne Capital Corp. 542775 Alberta Ltd., [1999] 45 B.L.R. 2d 21, 1999 
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conspiracy to cause economic harm and to interfere with its interest and 
that those actions amounted to an abuse of process.  The trial judge 
dismissed Colborne’s claim, finding its action a sham, and awarded 
Stampeder CAN$3,630,000 in compensatory damages and 
CAN$1,000,000 in punitive damages.  The trial judge determined that 
Colborne’s law suit had harmed the economic interests of Stampeder and 
Westar, and caused uncertainty in the investment community. On appeal, 
the Alberta Court of Appeal reduced the compensatory damages award to 
CAN$1,815,000 and vacated the punitive damages award.  With respect to 
the latter, it ruled that the size of the award was unprecedented, amounted 
to a windfall for the plaintiffs, and served “no rational purpose that wasn’t 
met by a fair calculation of compensatory damages.”
259  Interestingly, the 
Court of Appeal commented that the trial judge’s award of punitive 
damages “calls up the concerns arising from some recent American 
runaway jury awards in cases against insured corporate entities such as 
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore and others. . . . This is not to say that 
punitive damages should be taken from triers of fact, but it  only that such 
awards should be carefully policed, especially where relief lies 
elsewhere.”
260
Finally, in Y v. C, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant sexually 
abused her for seven years and verbally abused her until she reached 
eighteen, thus causing her to be dysfunctional in relationships.
261 The jury 
awarded CAN$350,000 in compensatory damages, CAN$50,000 for past 
wage lost, and CAN$250,000 in punitive damages.  The Court of Appeal 
reduced the compensatory damages to CAN$250,000 and the punitive 
damages to CAN$50,000. It ruled that although the jury was justified in 
awarding punitive damages, CAN$250,000 was inordinately high and 
beyond what was needed to punish the defendant and to deter others.  It 
ruled that the goals of  punishment and deterrence had to some extent 
already been fulfilled by the large compensatory damages award, which 
included aggravated damages, and that CAN$50,000 was thus sufficient to 
punish the defendant for his “callous disregard and violation of the 
plaintiff’s rights” and to “reflect the jury’s outrage of the community at the 
egregious conduct.”
262
259. Id. at  ¶¶ 291, 294.
260. Id. at ¶ 291.
261. See Y (S.) v. C (F.G.) [1996] 26 B.C.L.R. 3d 155, 1996 CarswellBC 1646.
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In sum, like the United States, Canada permits punitive damages in  
both tort and contract actions.  It also has witnessed an increase in large 
punitive damages awards.
IV.  CONCLUSIONS
This study reveals that there exists no universal consensus on  
punitive damages.  Nonetheless, it permits drawing several conclusions.
Availability. As a general rule, common law countries permit the 
award of punitive damages in private actions.  Today, they are available in 
a wide variety of tort actions where the defendant has engaged in 
exceptionally objectionable conduct.  In fact, the types of cases in which 
punitive damages may be claimed appears to have increased in recent 
years.  Most importantly, in 2001, England’s House of Lords discarded the 
rule limiting the availability of punitive damages to those types of cases 
where awards of such damages had been given prior to 1964.  Thus, 
punitive damages are now available in many countries, including England, 
for suits based on negligence and race or sex discrimination.  However, 
they are not awarded in breach of contract cases, except in the United 
States and Canada.
Claims for punitive damages also seem to be increasing in 
common law countries.  Australia, Canada and the United States appear to 
have seen an overall increase in punitive damages awards.
263  New 
Zealand has seen a greater number of punitive damages claims in personal 
injury cases.
264  And the Law Commission in England anticipates an 
increase in punitive damages claims in defamation actions.
265
Quantum.  Countries employ a variety of methods to determine the 
amount of a punitive damages award.  The United States gives the jury the 
most latitude in fixing the award.  There, juries are given broad discretion 
to set the award at an amount appropriate to punish defendants and deter 
future misconduct. By contrast, other countries have identified various 
factors for judges and juries to use in setting the punitive damages award.  
263. See Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, 621; Second Submission by the 
Law Council of Australia to the Negligence Review Panel on the Review of the Law of Negligence 
¶ 11.237 (Sept. 2, 2002); BLATT, supra note 4, at 11-16.
264. See Joanna Manning, Exemplary Damages in Negligence: The Story of a Screening 
Programme, 9 TORTS L.J. 19, 22 (2001).
265. See Law Commission Report, supra note 7, at ¶ 4.14.Punitive Damages:  A Comparative Analysis
52
These factors tend to focus on the gravity of the misconduct, the wealth of 
the defendant, the windfall that would result to the plaintiff, the effect on 
the public fisc, and whether the defendant has been subject to criminal 
sanctions.  England has employed damages brackets to provide some 
guidelines for awarding punitive damages in particular types of cases.
The United States has the largest punitive damages awards.  This 
phenomena seems to be the result of a complex interrelationship of 
factors.  One such factor may be that punitive damages are viewed as 
essentially “quasi criminal” and operate as “private fines” intended to 
punish and deter wrongdoing,
266 and sentences and punishment for crimes 
in the United States are more severe than in other Western countries.
267
Thus, there may be a correlation between imposing large awards of 
punitive damages and imposing severe criminal sanctions.  Another 
consideration is that, unlike courts in other countries, American courts 
have not provided detailed factors and guidelines to determine the size of 
punitive damages awards.  Factors and guidelines may deter unreasonably 
large awards.  A third factor appears to be that, unlike some other 
countries, American courts have not consistently mandated that awards of 
punitive damages are to be modest in size.
268
By contrast, New Zealand appears to have the smallest punitive 
damages awards.  Unlike the United States where punitive damages in a 
single case can amount to millions of dollars, awards in New Zealand 
rarely exceed NZ$100,000, with the average award being NZ$31,000 
(approximately US$18,000).
269  New Zealand’s success in controlling the 
size of punitive damages awards appears to be attributable to the vigorous 
266. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001).
267.  See  Michael  Tonry,  Parochialism  in  U.S.  Sentencing  Policy,  45  CRIME  & 
DELINQUENCY 48, 61 (1999) (stating that “sentence lengths have been vastly longer in the United 
States . . . than in other Western countries”); see also SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN 
COUNTRIES 3-4 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds, 2001).  Interestingly, one commentator 
notes that, “[i]n the United States, some of the harshest and most rigid sentencing laws have been 
adopted by citizen referendums.”  Tonry, supra, at 63.
268. One commentator speculates that the practice in the United States reflects a desire 
on the part of juries to use punitive damages to compensate plaintiffs for expenses and injury not 
covered by compensatory damages and to force companies to act responsibly.  T. N.M. King, Torts 
in America, 146 NEW L.J. 999 (1996).  He argues that other countries have national health care 
systems and tighter government control over business activity which reduces the need for large 
damages awards.  See id.
269. NZ$31,000=US$18,344.47, based on an exchange rate of  NZ$1 = US$ 0.591757, 
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efforts by its courts to keep awards modest in size and to prevent parties 
from claiming large awards of punitive damages.
Excessive Awards.  All countries prohibit excessive awards of 
punitive damages. What constitutes excessive damages, however, is 
unclear. 
Many countries employ the formulation that an award of punitive 
damages is unreasonable when it is out of proportion to the circumstances 
of the case.  That formulation, however, appears to require an intensely 
factual, case-specific determination made by the appropriate domestic 
court.
In an effort to curb large award of punitive damages, the United 
States and England have articulated ratios for courts to use as a guidepost 
in deciding whether an award is unreasonably large.  In the United States, 
awards of punitive damages that are more than ten times the amount of 
compensatory damages are likely invalid.
270  In England, the punitive 
damages award in most cases should not exceed three times the basic 
damages.
271 By contrast, Australian and Canadian courts have rejected the 
use of ratios on the ground that this approach places the focus on the 
plaintiff’s loss rather than on the defendant’s misconduct.
272
To summarize, recent years have seen a rise in claims for punitive 
damages in many common law countries.  As these claims have increased, 
so too have efforts to limit the size of punitive damages awards.  To date, 
these efforts, as well as their success, have varied greatly. It seems likely 
that these efforts will continue in the coming years, particularly in 
countries, such as the United States, where punitive damages awards are 
significant.
Finally, we have not yet witnessed to a significant degree the 
harmonization of the laws and practices concerning punitive damages as in 
other areas in light of globalization.  The one country where such 
harmonization appears to be taking place is Canada, where the courts have 
looked in formulating their rules and procedures on punitive damages to 
how other countries had dealt with these issues.  The Canadian experience 
appears to have resulted in punitive damages being available in a wide 
270. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1524 (2003).
271. See Thompson v. Commission of Police of the Metropolis, [1998] Q.B. 498, 518.
272. See XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty. Ltd. v. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. (1985) 155 
CLR 448, 471; Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 209 D.L.R. (4
th) 257, 2002 Carswell Ont. 537, at ¶ 
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range of actions, as in the United States, and in the use of detailed factors 
to determine the amount of punitive damages, as in England, Australia and 
New Zealand.  It is also of interest that, as in the United States, punitive 
damages awards in Canada have increased significantly in recent years.
Notwithstanding the Canadian experience, it appears that the push 
toward globalization may have highlighted the differences between 
countries on punitive damages, particularly the disparity between the size 
of awards in the United States and in other countries. For example, the 
United States was unable to conclude a bilateral judgments recognition 
treaty with the United Kingdom primarily because British insurance and 
manufacturing interests objected to the recognition of antitrust awards, 
excessive American jury verdict and punitive damages awards.
273
Similarly, whether other countries would agree to enforce American 
punitive damages awards has been  labeled “one of the most difficult 
make-or-break issues” in drafting the proposed Hague Convention on the 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters.
274  Even with efforts by United States 
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, to rein in unreasonably large 
awards, it seems unlikely in the near future that the gap between the size of 
punitive damages awards in the United States and in other countries will 
close in any meaningful way.
273. See Friedrich K. Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
111, 113 (1998); Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A 
New Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271, 274 (1994).
274. See Louise Lussier, A Canadian Perspective, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 31, 69 (1998).  
After much study and debate, a compromise was then reached pursuant to which punitive damages 
would be  recognized at least to the extent that similar or comparable damages could have been 
awarded in the State addressed.  See Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Adopted by the Special Commission on 30 October 
1999,  art.  33,  available  at  http://www.state.gov/www/global/legal_affairs/991030_forjudg.html. 
Several  countries  subsequently  backed  away  from  this  compromise.    See  Marc  E.  Hankin, 
Proposed Convention Would Help IP Owners, NAT’L L.J. C20 (Jul. 23, 2001); see also Elaine 
Massock et al., Recent Developments in International Tort and Insurance Law and Practice, 34 
TORT & INS. L.J. 519, 539 (1999) (“The existence of noncompensatory or excessive damages in 
U.S. judgments continues to be a dilemma” in the Hague foreign judgments convention meetings.).  
The most recent Report on the Work of the Informal Working Group on the Judgments Project, 25-
28 March 2003, available at  ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/jdgm_pd22e.doc, indicates that issues relating to 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign punitive damages awards remain unresolved.  See id. at 
26.